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I. INTRODUCTION 
In every negligence case, someone must ultimately decide 
whether the defendant's responsibility or duty to the plaintiff includes 
the risk which occurred. The issue is inescapable.' At common law, the 
issue was disguised as what courts and commentators called proximate 
cause. As any first-year torts student will attest, neither the explanation 
nor the analysis of the issue was particularly satisfying. The authors of 
the Restatement of Torts 2 and the Restatement (Second) of Torts3 called 
the issue legal cause, an arguably more accurate name that sadly did 
not meaningfully contribute to any greater clarity.4 Louisiana, 
influenced by the work of Dean Leon Green and Professor Wex 
Malone adopted another approach-the so-called Duty/Risk approach. 
Leon Green, Wex Malone, and others defrocked proximate or 
legal cause and pulled back the cloak covering the wizard. What Green 
and Malone and others did was to make clear that proximate cause and 
all its mumbo jumbo language, such as foreseeable, unforeseeable, 
foresight, hindsight, direct, remote, natural and probable, intervening 
causes, superseding causes, chains of causation, etc., were really not 
rules of law, but descriptions of results.' They were shibboleths that did 
nothing but befog. Green and Malone made clear that when a court 
talked about proximate cause it was talking about two things: cause-in-
fact-a factual question-and scope of duty or liability, which they 
considered a matter of policy, not a result which the application of some 
preexisting legal rule mandated.6 
From Green and Malone's Legal Realist wisdom, the Duty/Risk 
method of analyzing negligence was born. The Louisiana Supreme 
Court essentially adopted that Duty/Risk approach to analyzing 
negligence in a 1962 violation of statute case, Dixie Drive It Yourself 
System New Orleans Co. v. American Beverage Co.,' and in 1972, in a 
1. Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60, 73 (1956) 
[hereinafter Malone, Cause-in-Fact]. 
2. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 9 (AM. LAW INST. 1934). 
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
4. See id. 
5. See, e.g., Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself Versus 
American Beverage Company, 30 LA. L. REv. 363, 363-64 (1970) [hereinafter Malone, Dixie 
Drive It]. 
6. See, e.g., id. 
7. 137 So. 2d 298 (La. 1962). 
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garden-variety negligence case where there were no statutes involved, 
Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc.8 Duty/Risk became the so-called style 
for negligence analysis in the state. Under the Green and Malone 
Duty/Risk approach to negligence, the court should expressly confront 
the scope of responsibility question and address it as a matter of policy 
in every case.9 
As Green and Malone clearly intended and as the Louisiana 
Supreme Court initially implemented the approach, the judge, not the 
jury, was the administrative actor who decided whether the duty the 
defendant owed included the risk, which befell the plaintiff in the 
manner in which it occurred.'o The Louisiana Duty/Risk method of 
analysis turned the proximate cause question into a question for the 
judge, rather than a question for the jury." To Green, the proximate 
cause question (and he eschewed the phrase proximate cause) was a 
question of policy for judicial determination.12 Malone agreed. 3 
Years later, the American Law Institute, in the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, followed 
suit" and adopted something very much like the Duty/Risk approach." 
Section 29 provides, "An actor's liability is limited to those harms that 
result from the risks that made the actor's conduct tortious."l6 The 
Restatement (Third) abandoned the terms "proximate cause" and "legal 
cause" in favor of a scope of the risk analysis," similar to Green and 
Malone's approach. But there is a critical difference between the 
Green/Malone Duty/Risk approach and the Restatement (Third) 
approach. While Green and Malone entrusted the scope of liability 
question to the judge, the Restatement (Third) gives it to the jury (or 
judge as fact finder)." 
8. 256 So. 2d 620 (La. 1972). 
9. See id. at 622; Dixie Drive It, 137 So. 2d at 304. 
10. Malone, Cause-in-Fact, supra note 1, at 72; see Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 
5, at 377. 
11. Hill, 256 So. 2d at 622-23. 
12. LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 76-77 (1927) [hereinafter GREEN, 
RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE]. 
13. Malone, Cause-in-Fact, supra note 1, at 72; Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 5, 
at 377. 
14. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABLITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 29 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2005). 
15. Id 
16. Id § 29. 
17. Id § 26 cmt. a. 
18. Id §26 cmt. b. 
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In 1997, my friend, the late Professor David W. Robertson 
proposed essentially the same thing for Louisiana. He called his 
approach, under which the jury would decide scope of the risk, a 
"Keetonian" approach, in honor of the eminent torts teacher and 
scholar, Dean Page Keeton.19 Dave and I engaged in a scholarly 
conversation about the issue (and other negligence-related topics) in 
the Louisiana Law Review.20 I did not overtly disagree with him, but 
neither did I expressly agree. It is past time for me to admit that I was 
wrong in not expressly agreeing.2 1 I did not then sufficiently 
comprehend that there is a serious problem with entrusting the scope 
of responsibility decision to a judge. The problem is that, in a garden-
variety tort case, policy is not at issue to any significant degree. What 
is at stake is a basic question of fairness and common sense, which is 
inextricably dependent upon the particular facts of the particular case.22 
Consequently, the fact finder, not the judge, should decide scope 
of liability or scope of the risk in a garden-variety tort case. The scope 
of liability is not a legal determination.2 3 The scope of liability is a fact-
specific decision and its resolution is case-specific. It is not a question 
of law. Law applies to classes of actors and classes of cases. It does not 
change with the minute and particular facts of isolated cases. Deciding 
what is fair and what comports with logic and common sense in most 
garden-variety tort cases is exactly why we employ juries or judges as 
fact finders, rather than lawgivers. 
When judges decide both the broad duty question and the scope 
of the risk question, they blur the line between the broad, legal duty 
question and the scope of liability question in a specific case. Moreover, 
this blurring leads courts to combine or conflate duty and scope of 
19. David W. Robertson, Allocating Authority Among Institutional Decision Makers 
in Louisiana State-Court Negligence and Strict Liability Cases, 57 LA. L. REV. 1079, 1092-96 
(1997) [hereinafter RobertsonAllocating Authority]; David W. Robertson, The Vocabulary of 
Negligence Law: Continuing Causation Confusion, 58 LA. L. REV. 1, 19-21 (1997). 
20. See, e.g., Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Cats or Gardens: Which Metaphor Explains 
Negligence? Or, Is Simplicity Simpler than Flexibility?, 58 LA. L. REV. 35 (1997) [hereinafter 
Galligan, Cats or Gardens]; Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Revisiting the Patterns of Negligence: 
Some Ramblings Inspired by Robertson, 57 LA. L. REV. 1119 (1997) [hereinafter Galligan, 
Revisiting the Patterns ofNegligence]. 
21. Galligan, Cats or Gardens, supra note 20; Galligan, Revisiting the Patterns of 
Negligence, supra note 20. 
22. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., 
dissenting) ("What we do mean by the word 'proximate' is that, because of convenience, of 
public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events 
beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics."). 
23. See id. 
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liability.24 And, as noted above, the blurring of the line between duty at 
a broad, categorical level and scope of liability at a case-specific level 
blurs the allocation of decision-making authority between judge and 
jury. This piece is a call for courts in garden-variety negligence cases 
to clearly separate duty from scope of the risk or scope of liability and 
to recognize that the fact finder should determine scope of liability 
because the decision is not based on any broad policy, but on the facts 
of the particular case and the fact finder's sense of fairness in that 
particular case. 
At the same time, and on a more technical level, Louisiana courts 
have been inconsistent in their articulation or application of the 
Duty/Risk method. They have stated the elements of negligence under 
the Duty/Risk method in multiple, inconsistent ways. The courts should 
clarify the elements of negligence, the order in which administrative 
actors consider and analyze them, and, as noted, who should decide 
what question. 
In Part II, I set forth the traditional approach to negligence and its 
elements. In Part III, I summarize Green and Malone's attack on the 
concept of proximate cause and their solution. Part IV discusses the 
birth of Louisiana's Duty/Risk method of analyzing negligence cases. 
Part V describes the early leading Louisiana Duty/Risk cases and how 
the courts did not and have not articulated and applied policy at the 
case-specific level. The Part also argues that courts have not done so 
because doing so is, in fact, inappropriate. The scope of liability in a 
particular case is not a policy issue but a case-specific fairness issue. 
Part V sets forth the inconsistent analytical approaches Louisiana 
courts have used under the so-called heading of Duty/Risk. Part VI 
briefly recaps, and Part VII discusses duty (not scope of liability) as 
policy. Part VIII argues that it is time for Louisiana to follow the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional 
Injury's approach to scope of liability and give the question to the fact 
finder. Part IX briefly concludes. 
24. The courts have also conflated duty and breach, but that is a topic for another 
article. 
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II. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO NEGLIGENCE 
Traditionally, negligence had four elements: duty, breach, 
causation, and damages.2 5 Thanks to the work of the realists and others, 
the law now predominantly breaks the causation question into two 
separate elements: cause-in-fact and proximate cause.2 6 Some, 
including the Restatement 27 and Restatement (Second) of Torts,28 
replaced "proximate cause" with "legal cause." Under the most 
common approach to negligence, duty is a question for the court-a 
legal question. 2 9 The other elements were all questions for the jury-
either factual questions or mixed questions of fact and law.30 Expressed 
in table form, negligence was: 
Element Who Decides 
Duty Judge 
Breach Jury 
Cause-in-Fact Jury 
Proximate/Legal Cause Jury 
Damages Jury31 
In most tort cases, duty is essentially assumed as all persons owe 
a duty to others to exercise reasonable care to avoid foreseeable risks.32 
There were and continue to be some exceptions to this generally 
applicable broad duty to exercise reasonable care. For instance, in 
25. See, e.g., Kadylak v. Royal Caribbean Cruise, Ltd., 167 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1308 
(S.D. Fla. 2016); Hayes v. D.C.I. Props.-D KY LLC, 563 S.W.3d 619, 622 (Ky. 2018); 
Denmanv. Coppola Gen. Contracting Corp., 683 N.Y.S.2d 617,618 (N.Y. App. Div. 3 1998). 
26. DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, DOBBS' LAW OF TORTS 
§ 124, Westlaw (database updated June 2019) [hereinafter DOBBS ON TORTS]. 
27. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 9 (AM. LAWINST. 1934). 
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
29. See, e.g., Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primer on the Patterns ofNegligence, 53 LA. 
L. REv. 1509, 1510-11 (1993) [hereinafter Galligan, Primer] 
30. See id. at 1510-15. 
Mixed questions of law and fact are defined "as questions in which the historical 
facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is resolved and the issue is whether 
the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of 
law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated." 
Mixed Question of Law and Fact Law and Legal Definition, US LEGAL, https://definitions. 
uslegal.com/m/mixed-question-of-law-and-fact/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2020) (quoting Bausch & 
Lomb, Inc. v. United States, 21 CT. INT'L TRADE 166, 169 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997)). 
31. See Galligan, supra note 29, at 1510-15. 
32. See DOBBS ON TORTS, supra note 26, § 125. 
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certain, broad categories of cases, the law traditionally did not 
recognize a duty even though the defendant's conduct posed a 
foreseeable risk of harm to another. In each of these areas there were 
policy reasons for not imposing liability. For instance, courts held that 
a defendant had no duty to affirmatively act to help another person.33 
Courts based this rule, in part, on the difference between misfeasance 
and nonfeasance and the philosophical notion that one should have the 
liberty to choose or to choose not to help another.3 4 Courts also held 
that a defendant had no duty to exercise reasonable care to protect 
against negligently inflicted emotional distress.3 5 That rule was based, 
in part, on doubts about administrative competence.36 Courts doubted 
that judges and juries effectively could determine whether someone 
had really suffered emotional distress.37 The law doubted, given the 
available science, that decision makers reliably could separate the real 
from the fraudulent or overstated claims.38 There was also a fear that 
the courts would be inundated with claims.39 Likewise, a defendant 
owed no duty to protect against negligently inflicted economic loss 
unless there was some personal injury or property damage as well.40 
Courts based this rule on an administrative concern that otherwise tort 
law would essentially devour the law of contracts." In addition, courts 
were concerned that liability would be unlimited or potentially 
unlimited thereby over deterring societal actors, i.e., frustrating 
otherwise beneficial activity.42 And, knowing that a court had to draw 
a liability/no liability line somewhere, there was a concern that 
recognizing liability on a case-by-case basis would be arbitrary, thus 
undermining reliance, trust, and confidence in the legal system.4 3 
There were other no-duty rules. Today many of the traditional no-
duty rules have eroded to some extent. But where there is a duty today 
in these former no duty zones, there are conditions or limitations to 
33. Id § 405. 
34. See id. 
35. Id § 390. 
36. See id. 
37. See id 
38. Id 
39. See id 
40. Id § 515. 
41. See, e.g, E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transam. DelavellInc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986). 
42. See id at 874. It is fascinating that while courts have and do express concern for 
overdeterrence, the concern is never empirically demonstrated. See, e.g, Louisiana ex rel. 
Guste v. AV Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1029 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom White v. 
AIV Testbank, 477 U.S. 903 (1986). 
43. Louisiana ex rel Guste, 752 F.2d at 1028-29. 
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proceeding, so one might call them conditional or limited duties, 
meaning simply that in many of the traditional no-duty cases, there are 
requirements for recovery beyond causing a foreseeable injury to 
another person. For instance, in a Louisiana negligent infliction of 
emotional distress bystander case, the bystander must witness the direct 
victims suffer injury or come upon the scene shortly thereafter, there 
must be an identified familial relationship between the person who sues 
for emotional distress and the person who suffered the injury, and 
44 more.
All of these old no-duty rules were based upon policy analyses 
prevalent at the time the courts articulated them. These policy 
justifications for traditional no duty rules are what Green might have 
called the "administrative" factor.4 ' That is, the relevant policy had to 
do with administrative concerns about the court's ability to consistently 
deal with either a type of issue (psychological injury) or the volume of 
litigation potential liability might spawn.46 The current conditions for 
or limitations to recovery also reflect policy concerns, but the policies 
apply at the categorical level, not at the case-specific level. That is, the 
courts perform the policy analysis at a broad level of generality. The 
decision not to recognize a duty or to create a conditional duty applies 
to all similar cases; it does not turn on the facts of the particular case. 
Even if limited or no duty rules yield harsh results in particular cases, 
the broader policy objectives are served. At the categorical level, the 
law should be predictable and consistent, if not always fair on the 
particular facts. 
Returning to the theme of the Introduction, duty is not as easy and 
clear as I have just made it because one of the things that continues to 
make duty and proximate cause confusing to the law student and 
lawyer is Justice Cardozo's majority opinion in Palsgrafv Long Island 
Railroad Co.48 It is confusing because the burgeoning lawyer reads it 
when her class begins to discuss and study "proximate cause," but what 
44. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.6 (2020); see also Trahan v. McManus, 97-1224, p. 14 
(La. 3/2/99); 728 So. 2d 1273, 1281 (holding that parents may not recover for emotional 
distress associated with watching their son die after health care providers misdiagnosed his 
condition). 
45. LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930) [hereinafter GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY]. 
46. Id. at 84-87. Of course, there never seems to be any real empirical support for the 
volume fear. The sky may well be threatening to fall (an allusion to the tale of "Chicken 
Little"), but there is never any radar (an allusion to weather) to indicate that is actually about 
to occur. 
47. Id. at 77-87. 
48. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
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Cardozo actually said (amongst other things) was that "[t]he plaintiff 
sues in her own right for a wrong personal to her, and not as the 
vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to another."49 That is, he 
seemed to say there was no duty owed.o He continued: "[T]he orbit of 
the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be the 
orbit of the duty."" But what is the relationship between proximate 
cause and duty? Doesn't everyone, absent some broad policy or 
policies applicable to classes of cases, owe a duty to protect against 
foreseeable harm?52 It would seem so. But let me pause before giving 
my answer to that question (which is yes) and turn to the work of Green 
and Malone and the birth of Duty/Risk. 
III. GREEN AND MALONE AND THE ATTACK ON PROXIMATE CAUSE 
No scholar writes on a clean slate. All work depends upon the 
work of those who have come before, and there were many important 
torts scholars before Leon Green whose work he built on.53 But Green 
was singular and focused in his pointed and sustained attack on the so-
called doctrine of proximate cause. Later, LSU Law Professor Wex 
Malone joined Green in his assault. Green was a Louisianan who 
gained fame elsewhere. Malone was a North Carolinian who achieved 
fame for his work while teaching in Louisiana at LSU. 
Green was a legal realist. Legal realism was a complex and 
significant school of legal thought that really began to develop in the 
early part of the twentieth century and flourished just before and during 
the New Deal era. The realists were reacting to and challenging Legal 
Formalism, which held that judges decided cases based upon existing 
law and legal decisions.56 The notion of the law library as a place to 
discover the law is a formalist view of law because it implies that the 
49. Id at 100. 
50. See id. 
51. Id 
52. See id at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting) ("Every one [sic] owes to the world at large 
the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others."). 
For the modem view, see also DOBBS ON TORTS, supra note 26, § 125 (describing the elements 
of negligence). 
53. For a thorough discussion of the work both before and after Green, see Patrick J. 
Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present Darkness, 69 
WASH. U. L.Q. 49 (1991). 
54. See, e.g., GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, supra note 45; GREEN, RATIONALE OF 
PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 12. 
55. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEx. L. REv. 731, 734 
(2009). 
56. See id at 750. 
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seeker will discover the law in the law books included therein. A 
thorough discussion of legal realism is well beyond the scope of this 
Article, but to quote Professor Brian Leiter: 
The Core Claim of Legal Realism consists of the following descriptive 
thesis about judicial decision-making: judges respond primarily to the 
stimulus of facts. Put less formally-but also somewhat less 
accurately-the Core Claim of Realism is that judges reach decisions 
based on what they think would be fair on the facts of the case, rather 
than on the basis of the applicable rules of law. 
Thus, in part, Green was reacting to and revolting against the idea 
that there was a formalist, determinative "law" of proximate cause. To 
Green and others, there were several inherent problems in the idea of 
proximate cause. First, as mentioned above, courts were prone, when 
referring to proximate cause, to lump what we now think of as cause-
in-fact together with scope of liability as one element.59 The separation 
of cause-in-fact from the determination of the scope of liability (or 
duty) was meaningful and significant. The former-cause-in-fact-is 
a primarily factual question. The scope of liability (or duty) questions 
involves other considerations. 60 In essence the separation of cause-in-
fact and scope of liability meant negligence had five elements not four. 
An additional objection to the traditional proximate cause analysis 
remains the continuing tendency of some judges to refer to the "sole" 61 
57. Now, one supposes the formalist would discover the law on his or her computer 
searching legal databases. 
58. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 
TEx. L. REv. 267, 275 (1997). 
59. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, supra note, 45 at 186-95; GREEN, RATIONALE OF 
PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 12, at 132-41; see also Malone, Cause-in-Fact, supra note 1 
(detailing cause-in-fact, including how it can relate to scope of liability). 
60. Interestingly, while its roots are clearly in legal realism, the courts have sometimes 
said it comports withthe civilian tradition. Landry v. Bellanger, 2002-1443, p. 13 (La. 5/20/03); 
851 So. 2d 943, 953 ("civilian concepts" such as "duty/risk"); Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 
521 So. 2d 1123, 1132 (La. 1988); Polkv. Blanque, 93-1740 (La. App. 4th Cir. 3/15/94); 633 
So. 2d 1382, 1387 ("Under the duty/risk analysis adopted in our civilianjurisdiction"); LeJeune 
v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 539 So. 2d 849, 856, 857 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989) ("civilian principles 
of duty/risk" and "civilian duty-risk analysis"); Bishop v. Callais, 533 So. 2d 121, 123 (La. 
App. 4th Cir. 1988) ("civilian principles of duty risk"). 
61. See, e.g., Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 839 (1996); Turlington 
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 795 F.2d 434, 440 (5th Cir. 1986); Adriatic Ins. Co. v. Holt, 617 So. 
2d 184, 186 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993); Thomas v. Champion Ins. Co., 603 So. 2d 765, 770 (La. 
App. 3d Cir. 1992); Everettv. La. Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 424 So. 2d 336, 341-42 (La. App. 
1st Cir. 1982); W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OwEN, 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 452 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984); cf CSX 
Transp. Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 688 (2011) (quoting Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 
U.S. 500, 504-06 (1957)) (discussing the traditional formulation of proximate cause). 
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cause of an accident. The idea that there is a sole cause of any event is 
ridiculous. Courts used and use the phrase "sole" proximate cause to 
relieve a defendant of liability, finding either some other person6 2 or 
even the plaintiff63 was the "sole" proximate cause of the injury. Courts 
sometimes used the phrase in conjunction with the concept of the 
intervening cause, which could rise to the level of a superseding cause64 
and thereby break the so-called chain of causation and relieve the 
defendant of liability.6 5 In common parlance, the superseding cause let 
the defendant, perhaps a railroad or other industrially significant entity, 
off the liability hook. 
A related target for Green was the tendency of courts to relieve all 
but the last piece or actor in the causation chain of liability.66 That is, 
the courts overly concerned themselves with the sequence of events,67 
rather than the logic or fairness of what had happened and how it had 
happened, a trend that continues today.68 The adjective "proximate," 
meaning near, no doubt fueled this illogical fire. This tendency might 
manifest itself in a conclusion that the injury was remote in time and 
space from the defendant's negligent act.6 9 It is not reading too much 
between the lines to say that the realists were more concerned with the 
practical substance of things rather than the sequence. 
Lastly, for present purposes, Green bristled at the fact that courts 
said that proximate cause was a question for the jury, that courts 
submitted the question to juries, and then, if they did not agree with the 
juries' conclusion, they reversed them. He said: 
62. See, e.g., Hessiferv. So. Equip., Inc., 416 So. 2d 368, 373 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982). 
63. Exxon Co., 517 U.S. at 839-41. 
64. See, e.g, Ins. Co. v. Tweed, 74 U.S. 44, 52-53 (1868); Johnsonv. Morehouse Gen. 
Hosp., 2010-0387, pp. 43-44 (La. 5/10/11); 63 So. 3d 87, 116-17; Adamsv. Rhodia, Inc., 2007-
2110, p. 13 (La. 5/21/08); 983 So. 2d798, 808. 
65. See, e.g, Exxon Co., 517 U.S. at 839-40. 
66. For a rejection of the last cause argument in a FELA case, see CSX Transportation 
Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. at 712 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
67. See, e.g, Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Calhoun, 213 U.S. 1, 7 (1909); 
Rossiter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 255 So. 2d 103, 109 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971); Hoover v. 
Wagner, 189 So. 2d 20, 27 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966); Kendall v. New Orleans Pub. Sewy., 45 
So. 2d 541, 544 (La. App. Parish of Orleans 1950); Williams v. Pelican Creamery Inc., 30 So. 
2d 574, 576-77 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947); Cavarettav. Universal Film Exchs., 182 So. 135, 140 
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1938). 
68. See, e.g, Jacobs-Peterson v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 1096-97 (D. 
Utah 2016); Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996). 
69. See, e.g, Scheffer v. R.R. Co., 105 U.S. 249, 252 (1881); Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 
F. 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1921); Ardoin v. Williams, 108 So. 2d 817, 821 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959); 
Terrillv. ICT Ins. Co., 93 So. 2d 292, 295 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957); Cruze v. Harvey & Jones, 
134 So. 730, 732 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931). 
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If the result obtained from erroneously leaving the fictitious "cause" 
issue to the jury is palpably unjust, or if the result of leaving it to the jury 
would probably be so, the appellate court declares as a matter oflaw that 
there was in fact no causal relation issue to be left to the jury, and 
proceeds to deal with it as an issue of causation for the court. Here they 
make use of all those weighted phrases as "remote," "unforeseen," 
"intervening agencies," "independent agencies," and a score of others 
which are meaningless as solvents except they provide a smoke screen 
behind which the court can retire from an awkward position. They do 
here under the guise of determining "proximate cause" what should have 
been done by way of defining the scope of protection afforded by the rule 
invoked. 
Thus, the "law" of proximate cause was a sham. Judges were giving 
the question to the jury but then taking it away if they disagreed with 
the result.' Moreover, rather than explaining what was really going 
on-a judicial decision-they resorted to magic words that shielded 
the real process.72 This ruse also shielded who was really deciding-
the judge. 
Green believed that the judge should determine the scope of 
liability. That is evident in the last sentence quoted above. 73 Put 
differently, he said judges "do not recognize that they have a function 
to perform by way of defining the limits of the rule involved."74 Malone 
agreed.7 ' Thus to Green and Malone, the scope of liability (or duty) was 
a question for the judge.76 This is not inconsistent with Professor 
Leiter's contention that the core claim of legal realism was that judges 
were influenced by the facts, not legal rules. The realists believed that 
judges decided based on facts, underlying biases, and their 
backgrounds. 78 They did not decide merely because of doctrinal 
compulsion. While critical of formalism and judicial hocus pocus, the 
70. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 12, at 76-77. 
71. Id. at 76. 
72. Id. at 76-77. 
73. Id at 77 ("They do here under the guise of determining 'proximate cause' what 
should have been done by way of defining the scope of protection afforded by the rule 
invoked."). 
74. Id at 76. 
75. Malone, Cause-in-Fact, supra note 1, at 72; see Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 
5. 
76. Thus, aligning with Judge Cardozo's analysis in Palsgraf See Palsgraf v. Long 
Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928). 
77. Leiter, supra note 58, at 275. 
78. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on 
the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2007); cf Tamanaha, supra 
note 55, at 732 (describing the practicalities of realist judges). 
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realists had an optimistic side, or at least some of them did. The realists 
opined that once judges admitted what was going on and once they 
relied upon principle and data, the law might develop more rationally 
or at least more openly.79 Green hoped that perhaps then judges 
admittedly and openly deciding scope of liability questions would 
result in a more transparent and consistent law or field of negligence. 
Importantly, in contending that judges should decide scope of 
liability, Green and Malone did not distinguish between the scope 
question in classes of cases or the scope question in particular cases. In 
all instances, the judge decided the scope of liability. Malone noted his 
view in one of his most famous articles, Ruminations on Cause-in-
Fact:" 
The task of defining the proper reach or thrust of a rule in its policy 
aspects is one that must be undertaken by the court in each case as it 
arises. How appropriate is the rule to the facts of this controversy? This 
is a question that the court cannot escape.8' 
The scope of liability was omnipresent, and it was a decision for the 
judge. The judge could not "escape" it.82 That is, the court cannot 
escape the question (as some put it) whether the defendant owes a duty 
to the plaintiff to protect against the risk that arose in the manner in 
which it arose.83 
But, how would the court determine the scope of the liability? 
Green claimed that the scope of liability decision was based on several 
policy factors: the administrative factor, the ethical or moral factor, the 
economic factor, the prophylactic or preventive factor, and the justice 
factor, including the capacity to bear the loss." And Green apparently 
believed that basing proximate cause decisions on probability of harm, 
or foreseeability, was improper." Asserting that tort liability was based 
on public policy-not doctrine-was significant and remains the 
mainstream view; I will return later to the practical and theoretical 
realities of the application of policy to the particular facts of a garden-
79. H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and 
the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969, 977-78 (1977). 
80. Malone, Cause-in-Fact, supra note 1, at 73. 
81. Id 
82. Id 
83. See FRANKL. MARAIST, THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., WiLLIAMR. CORBETT& JOHN 
M. CHURCH, LOUISIANA TORT LAW § 5.01, Lexis Advance (database updated Dec. 2019). 
84. See GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, supra note 45, at 74-152. 
85. See GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 12, at 76. 
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variety tort case. But first it is important to point out another key aspect 
of the Green and Malone Duty/Risk analysis. 
Green and Malone both talked about the "rule of law" on which 
the plaintiff relied.8 6 The plaintiff supposedly pointed to a rule of law 
that it claimed the defendant violated. The judge considered whether 
that rule of law included the risk that injured the plaintiff. If so, the jury 
would decide whether the defendant, in violating the so-called rule of 
law, had failed to exercise reasonable care, i.e., had breached the 
standard of reasonable care, and, if so, whether the breach was a factual 
cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Sometimes the rule of law might be 
statutory and sometimes it might be "part of the fabric of the court-
made law of negligence."" 
It is somewhat ironic that those who attacked formalism would 
refer to "rules of law," especially those that were part of the fabric of 
court-made negligence. Are these rules of law judge-made rules? The 
idea of judge-made, conduct-based rules of law is reminiscent of 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.'s notion that, as judges became 
experienced, they would more freely take questions of breach from the 
jury. One such judge-made rule or duty was Holmes' "stop, look, and 
listen" rule." It was notably short-lived and ill-advised because 
8 9 reasonable care varies with the facts of each case. Somewhat 
ironically, it was Justice Benjamin Cardozo, the author of Palsgraf 
who gently criticized and effectively buried Holmes' "stop, look, and 
listen rule" only seven years after Holmes uttered it.90 In short there 
was, once and for all, no set in stone "stop, look, and listen rule." 9' 
One is left with the idea that the "rules of law" to which Green 
and Malone referred, at least when not based on statute, were not really 
rules of law so much as the judge (and scholar) turning what the 
plaintiff claimed was the defendant's alleged negligent act into a duty 
86. Id at 3-4; W. Malone, Cause-in-Fact, supra note 1, at 73; see also William L. 
Crowe, Sr., The Anatomy of a Tort-Greenian, as Interpreted by Crowe Who Has Been 
Influenced by Malone-a Primer, 22 Loy. L. REv. 903, 906 (1976) (discussing rule of law in 
the Duty/Risk analysis); Timothy J. McNamara, The Duties and Risks of the Duty-Risk 
Analysis, 44 LA. L. REV. 1227, 1233 (1984) (discussing rule of law in the Duty/Risk analysis). 
87. Malone, Cause-in-Fact, supra note 1, at 73. 
88. See Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 67-70 (1927). 
89. Pokom v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 105 (1934) (rejecting the hard and fast 
rule of Goodman). 
90. See id. at 99. 
91. Id at 105-06. 
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or rule for the particular case.92 But generally, the defendant's duty is to 
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.9 3 The particular 
alleged act of negligence is fact-based; it is not a rule of law.94 Certainly, 
this is the case where no statute is involved. By way of example, 
assume the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had failed to exercise 
ordinary care by eating a bagel, drinking coffee, and driving at the same 
time, resulting in the defendant hitting the plaintiff, a pedestrian, 
because the defendant was distracted by his various ingestions. The 
particular alleged act of negligence would morph into the "rule of law:" 
thou shalt not eat a bagel and drink coffee and drive at the same time. 
Of course, there really is no rule of law except the duty to exercise 
reasonable care under the circumstances. The bagel eating and coffee 
drinking while driving are facts that allegedly rise to the level of a 
breach. There is no rule and clearly no "law." 
Returning to the orthodox Duty/Risk approach, the judge would 
decide the scope of the rule of law (or scope of liability or duty). The 
judge would decide whether the "rule of law" prohibiting a person from 
eating a bagel, drinking coffee, and driving at the same time protected 
the plaintiff/pedestrian from being injured when the defendant hit her 
because he was distracted. Per Green and Malone, the judge would 
make this decision based on "policy." 95 
In any event, if the judge decided the "rule of law" included 
protection from the risk that occurred, the jury or fact finder would still 
have to decide whether the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care 
when the defendant ate a bagel, drank coffee, and drove at the same 
time. Was the particular alleged act of negligence (the so-called rule of 
law), in fact, a breach of the standard of reasonable care? And the jury, 
if it decided there was a breach, would then decide whether the breach 
was a factual cause of the injuries (cause-in-fact) and, if needed, 
damages. That was the theory of Duty/Risk. Now let us turn to the 
Louisiana experience. 
92. This discussion is very important in regard to the impact of Duty/Risk on breach, 
but it is also essential here insofar as it is crucial to an understanding of the approach. Ironically, 
by turning the particular alleged breach into a so-called rule of law, the realists obfuscated it. 
They used a phrase-rule of law-which was a misnomer. They also thus empowered the 
judge to hide behind that phrase as if he or she were making a judicial or legal decision, rather 
than a fairness decision. 
93. Pontchartrain Nat. Gas Sys. v. Tex. Brine Co., 2018-0606, p. 8 (La. App. 1st Cir. 
12/21/18); 268 So. 3d 1058, 1062 ("In negligence cases, there is an almost universal duty on 
the part of a defendant to use reasonable care to avoid injuring another."). 
94. See id. at p. 8; 268 So. 3d at 1062-63. 
95. See, e.g, Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 5, at 363-64. 
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IV. THE BIRTH OF DUTY/RISK LOUISIANA STYLE 
This Part provides a brief review of the introduction of Duty/Risk 
into Louisiana jurisprudence and its subsequent development. The 
discussion is not intended to be encyclopedic but will attempt to set 
forth the highlights in an evenhanded manner. 
A. Dixie Drive It Yourself System New Orleans Co. v. American 
Beverage Co. 
The jurisprudential genesis of Duty/Risk in Louisiana is Dixie 
Drive It Yourself System New Orleans Co. v. American Beverage Co. 9 6 
Dixie Drive It Yourselfwas, at its heart, a garden-variety traffic accident 
97 case. Dixie had leased its truck to Gulf States Screw Products 
Company.9 8 Langtre, a Gulf States employee, was driving the Dixie 
truck southbound on Airline Highway.99 It was drizzling or misting.'o 
The important thing to know about the truck lease was simply that 
Langtre was not Dixie's employee; therefore, the law would not impute 
Langtre's negligence to Dixie.' 
As Langtre drove south, unbeknownst to him, an R C Cola truck, 
owned by defendant American Beverage Company, had broken down 
in the same lane in which Langtre was traveling.'02 The breakdown 
occurred eight to ten minutes before Langtre appeared on the scene.'03 
The driver of the R C Cola truck did not move the vehicle to provide 
fifteen feet of unobstructed highway in violation of a statute.0 4 Nor did 
the driver of the R C Cola truck display warning signals one hundred 
feet behind and one hundred feet in front of the stalled vehicle.' This 
failure was a violation of another statute. 0 6 Finally, the driver did not 
take any action to warn approaching motorists of the stalled vehicle, 
arguably in violation of common sense and the general duty to exercise 
reasonable care.' 
96. 137 So. 2d 298 (La. 1962). 
97. Id at 299-300. 
98. d at 299. 
99. Id 
100. Id at 300. 
101. Id at 301. 
102. Id at 300. 
103. Id 
104. Id at 301-02 (quoting LA. R.S. § 32:241 (1951) (repealed)). 
105. Id 
106. Id (quoting LA. R.S. § 32:442 (1951) (repealed)). 
107. Id at 301, 304. 
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Predictably, Langtre did not notice the R C Cola truck until it was 
too late to stop. 08 Langtre attempted to move into the left lane, but there 
was another car in the left lane.109 Thus, Langtre jammed on his brakes 
but could not avoid a collision."10 A lawsuit followed. The plaintiff, 
Dixie, sought recovery for the damage to its truck."' The defendant 
argued that the R C Cola truck driver was not negligent and that the 
"sole cause" of the accident was Langtre's driving at an excessive rate 
of speed given the conditions, failing to keep a proper lookout, and 
failing to have his vehicle under sufficient control to avoid the 
collision." 2 Even if Langtre's negligence could not be imputed to Dixie 
because he was not their employee, his misconduct could still form the 
basis of the "sole cause" defense." 3 The trial court held for the 
defendant, and the court of appeal affirmed," concluding that although 
the R C Cola driver violated the statutes requiring the placement of 
warning signals and leaving fifteen unobstructed feet of roadway, his 
negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident." 5 
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. It focused its analysis on 
the signaling statute.11 6 It noted that the statute was a safety statute, 
designed to protect "life and property on the highways.""' As such, the 
court said the violation of the statute was "negligence per se""8 and 
would be actionable if the violation "was a legal cause of the 
collision."" Justice Sanders wrote: 
108. Id. at 300. 
109. Id 
110. Id 
111. d at 299. 
112. Id at 301. Interestingly, the so-called sole cause involved multiple alleged wrongs. 
Id 
113. Id at 301, 304. Another way to say it would be that Langtre's negligence was an 
intervening cause, which rose to the level of a superseding cause. Id at 304. 
114. Mat301. 
115. See Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys. New Orleans Co. v. Am. Beverage Co., 128 So. 
2d 841, 843 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 137 So. 2d 298 (La. 1962) ("Whatever negligence 
may have been involved on the part of the driver of the defendant vehicle had become passive 
and too remote to be a contributing cause of the accident. The sole proximate cause thereof 
was the negligence of the driver of the plaintiff truck. The defendant is not liable because the 
negligence of its employee-driver was not a proximate cause of the accident."). 
116. Dixie Drive it Yourself 137 So. 2d at 302 ("We conclude that the driver violated 
the statute by failing to display the red signal flags and to reasonably discharge his 
responsibility to protect traffic."). 
117. Id 
118. Id Today in Louisiana the procedural effect of violation of a statute in a negligence 
case is probably only evidence of negligence and not negligence per se, but the idea that the 
violation of a statute is relevant and possibly determinative in a case is still true. 
119. Id 
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There is no universal formula for the determination of legal cause. 
In the instant case it bifurcates into two distinct inquiries: whether the 
negligence of the obstructing driver was a cause-in-fact of the collision; 
and whether the defendants should be relieved of liability because of the 
intervening negligence of the driver of the Dixie truck. 
It is clear that more than one legally responsible cause can, and 
frequently does, contribute to a vehicular collision.'20 
The two quoted, short paragraphs are significant because they do 
four things, all of which are consistent with the Green/Malone assault 
on proximate cause. First, and notably, Justice Sanders used the phrase 
"legal cause," rather than proximate cause, something, as noted, the 
drafters of the first two Restatements also did.12 ' Second, he bifurcated 
his legal cause analysis into its two separate parts: (1) cause-in-fact and 
(2) scope of liability, i.e., whether to relieve the defendant from liability 
because of the "intervening"l2 act of Langtre.' 23 While the use of the 
word "intervening" is perhaps unfortunate given the intellectual history 
described above, the essence of the second inquiry, albeit under the 
guise of deciding whether to relieve the defendant of liability, is the 
scope of liability for the violation of statute. Thus, the third significant 
point-scope of liability-is a key inquiry in a negligence case. And 
finally, Justice Sanders expressly stated that there can be more than one 
legally responsible cause for an accident-thereby refuting the idea of 
the "sole" proximate cause.12 4 
Justice Sanders then turned to the analysis of cause-in-fact and 
concluded that the violation of the statutes was a cause-in-fact of the 
collision.' 25 Next, it was incumbent upon the court to determine the 
scope of the liability-i.e., whether to relieve the defendant of 
liability. 26 As noted, Justice Sanders expressly recognized that 
"whether a defendant should be relieved of liability because of the 
intervening negligence of another is frequently couched in terms of 
120. Id. 
121. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 9 (AM. LAW INST. 1934); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 (AM LAW INST. 1965). 
122. Dixie Drive it Yourself 137 So. 2d at 302. 
123. Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 5, at 377 (1 suggest that Dixie's potential for 
usefulness lies, not in any novelty that inheres in the decision, but rather in its insistence that 
cause and legal duty be approached as separate matters and that the considemtions of policy be 
libemted from the chrysallis of causation jargon and allowed to stand on their own footing."). 
124. Dixie Drive It Yourself 137 So. 2d at 302. 
125. Id. at 302-04. 
126. Id at 304. 
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proximate cause."l2 He then set forth the Louisiana Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the R C Cola driver's 
negligence had become too passive and remote, thereby negating his 
action as a proximate cause of the injury.' 28 In response to that 
conclusion, Justice Sanders said: "The thrust of th[e Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeal's] formulation of law is toward relieving all but the 
last wrongdoer of liability to an innocent victim in torts involving 
intervening negligence. This restrictive doctrine finds little support in 
legal theory. We do not subscribe to the formulation as applied in this 
case."l 2 9 
Recognizing that the nub of the question was "whether the risk 
and harm encountered by the plaintiff fall within the scope of protection 
of the statute," 30 Justice Sanders then proceeded to consider the scope 
of the statute. After citing and reviewing several cases and a student 
note,' 3 ' Justice Sanders cited Leon Green's Rationale of Proximate 
Cause and wrote: 
The inattention or confusion of motor vehicle drivers is not a highly 
extraordinary occurrence. The objective of the statutory provisions 
violated in the instant case was to protect against the likelihood that an 
oncoming motonst, whether cautious, confused or inattentive, would fail 
to timely perceive the vehicle or that it was stationary and become 
involved in an accident. The law was designed to protect the plaintiff 
(and any member of its class) against such an accident as occurred in this 
case. To deny recovery because of the plaintiff's exposure to the risk 
from which it was the purpose of the law to protect him would nullify 
the statutory duty and render its protection meaningless. The negligence 
of the driver of the Dixie truck was responsive to that of the driver of the 
R C Cola truck. It was dependent upon it. The negligence of the two 
combined to bring about harm to the plaintiff.13 2 
Thus, according to the court, the legislature had passed the statute in 
question, intending it to protect from injury arising from both an 
attentive and/or an inattentive driver colliding with a stopped vehicle. 
Interpreting the statute otherwise-not to include the risk of the 
127. Id. 
128. Id (quoting Dixie Drive It Yourself New Orleans Co. v. Am. Beverage Co., 128 
So. 2d 841, 842 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 137 So. 2d 298 (La. 1962)). 
129. Id (footnote omitted). 
130. Id 
131. Id at 304-05 (quoting Jesse D. McDonald, Comment, Proximate Cause in 
Louisiana, 16 LA. L. REV. 391, 396 (1956)). 
132. Id at 305-06 (citing GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 12, at 
142-44). 
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inattentive driver-would have rendered the statute meaningless, in 
part. This the court refused to do. Duty/Risk was born in Louisiana. 
To recap Dixie Drive it Yourself the court distanced itself from, if 
not eschewed, the phrase "proximate cause." The court clearly 
recognized that "cause" involved a factual inquiry-cause-in-fact-
and a more nuanced issue: the scope of liability.'3 3 Or, as the court put 
it, whether to relieve the defendant from liability. 34 The court, 
following Green and Malone, decided the scope of liability question 
itself and explained itself, rather than relying on the mumbo jumbo 
magic words associated with proximate cause.'35 And Justice Sanders 
expressly stated that there can be more than one cause of any accident 
and courts should not limit their consideration of the scope of liability 
to the sequence of events or whether the defendant's negligence had 
become "passive."136 
Let us tarry for a few words over one aspect of the opinion: the 
court's allocation of the scope of liability decision to itself That is, the 
court decided scope of liability.' 37 Is that because scope of liability is 
always a question for the court? Green'38 and Malone39 would have 
contended that is the case. But interestingly, Dixie Drive it Yourselfwas 
not a jury trial.1 40 It was a trial to the court, so there was no express 
reason to carefully consider decision-making responsibility. There is 
another critical reason why the court might properly decide scope of 
liability in a case like Dixie Drive it Yourself and not in every case. 
That reason is that Dixie Drive it Yourselfwas not a garden-variety 
negligence case; it was a case in which the plaintiff relied upon the 
violation of a statute to establish that the defendant was negligent. 141 
When a court considers whether to adopt a statute as the standard of 
care in a negligence case, or to allow the jury to consider the violation 
of a statute as evidence of the defendant's failure to exercise reasonable 
care, it asks itself two questions: 
133. Id at 302, 304. 
134. Id at 304. 
135. See id. at 304-07. 
136. Id at 304 (quoting Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys. New Orleans Co. v. Am. Bevemge 
Co., 128 So. 2d 841, 842 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 137 So. 2d 298 (La. 1962)). 
137. See id. at 304-07. 
138. See GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 12, at 76-77. 
139. See Malone, Cause-in-Fact, supra note 1, at 72-73. 
140. See 137 So. 2d at 303. 
141. Id at 300. 
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(1) Was the plaintiff a member of a class of persons whom the 
legislature enacted the statute to protect? 
(2) Was the risk that occurred within the class of risks that the 
legislature enacted the statute to guard against? 42 
Answering those two questions requires the court to interpret the 
statute.'43 In deciding question one, the court is essentially determining 
if the statute imposes an obligation on the defendant in favor of the 
plaintiff.' And in answering the second question, the court is deciding 
whether the statute imposes an obligation concerning the risk that arose 
in the case."' The court is deciding the scope of liability. The court is 
deciding whether, pursuant to the court's interpretation of the statute, 
the defendant owes a duty to protect the plaintiff (Q1) from the risk 
(Q2) that arose in the manner in which it arose. 
The entire judicial exercise in a violation of statute case involves 
the interpretation of a statute. Statutory interpretation is an inherently 
judicial function, and answering questions one and two in a violation 
of statute negligence case is appropriate for the court, as opposed to the 
fact finder (jury). Judges and lawyers are trained to read and interpret 
statutes. We go to law school for three years, and statutory 
interpretation is one of the core activities in which we engage. Statutes 
are often complicated and technical. It would be ludicrous to ask ajury 
to initially 4 6 decide the meaning and scope of a statute."' Of course, 
142. See DOBBS ON TORTS, supra note 26, § 148; see also Galligan, Primer, supra note 
29, at 1520-21 (noting that proof of these issues canbe a presumption of negligence or evidence 
of some negligence in other jurisdictions). 
143. Dixie Drive It Yourself 137 So. 2d at 304-06. 
144. See id. 
145. See id. 
146. Of course, in ajurisdiction where the violation of a statute is not negligence per se, 
the jury does have an opportunity to consider whether the violation of the statute was a violation 
of the standard of reasonable care, but only after the judge has considered questions one and 
two and determined that the jury can hear about and consider the statute. Put differently, the 
court considers questions one and two to decide if the statute is relevant in the case before the 
court. See also infra note 147 (discussing the difference between judge and jury functions in 
Louisiana violation of statute cases). 
147. The statement in text must be qualified somewhat. The broad interpretation of class 
of persons is properly for the court. The broad interpretation of the class of risks is also 
appropriately for the court. But it is arguable whether a judge is in a better position than a jury 
to decide whether the scope of liability in aviolation of statute negligence case includes or does 
not include the particular (and perhaps bizarre) manner in which the injury occurred. On this 
question, the common sense of the community may be just as reliable as a judicial 
determination of the scope of a statute, especially if the manner of occurrence was so 
idiosyncratic that it is most probable the legislature never thought about it. Notably, some 
courts include a proximate or legal cause element in their articulation of negligence in a 
violation of statute case. See Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580, 592-96 (Tenn. Ct. 
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that it is appropriate for a court to determine the scope of liability in a 
violation of statute negligence case does not mean that it is appropriate 
in every case. It does not mean it is appropriate for the court to consider 
scope of liability in a case where there is no statute. 4 s 
One last observation on Justice Sanders' opinion is appropriate, 
and it relates to how a court decides the scope of liability. As noted 
above, Green believed that courts should decide the scope of liability 
based on several policy factors.1 4 9 Justice Sanders' analysis of the scope 
of the statute at issue in Dixie Drive it Yourself does not appear to be 
driven by those policies.so The decision is very appropriately based 
upon Justice Sanders' interpretation of the statute.'' Critically, he 
noted, holding that the statute did not cover the risk that occurred (a 
wreck involving an inattentive driver) would have undermined the 
purpose of the statute.'5 2 Implicit in his decision is the notion that, 
administratively, it is appropriate for the court to decide the scope and 
reach of statutes (as I noted above).' 53 It is also implicit that the 
legislature was no doubt concerned with encouraging operators of 
broken-down cars to warn of the dangers associated with their stopped 
vehicles.' 4 But Justice Sanders expressed none of that in his opinion; 
there was no express policy discussion. Rather, there was a very 
judicious discussion and interpretation of the relevant statute and its 
scope. 
App. 2003). The jury's role in determining the so-called scope of the statute would seem most 
pronounced in ajurisdiction where the violation of statute is only some evidence of negligence, 
like in Louisiana. Ducote v. Boleware, 2015-0764, p. 14 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2/17/16); 216 So. 
3d 934, 944; see Galligan, Primer, supra note 29, at 1509, 1520-21. 
148. And in ajurisdiction like Louisiana, where the violation of a statute in a negligence 
case is not negligence per se but is some evidence of negligence, the judge, in answering 
questions one and two, is merely deciding whether the jury can even hear about the statute and 
its alleged violation. Ducote, 2015-0764 at pp. 13-18; 216 So. 3d at 943-44. That is, the court 
is merely deciding whether the statute is relevant in the tort case before it. See id. The jury 
ultimately decides whether there has been a breach of the standard of reasonable care and 
whether the scope of liability (risk) includes the injuries that occurred in the case before the 
court. 
149. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, supra note 45, at 74-152. 
150. Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 5, at 377. 
151. See Dixie Drive it Yourself Sys. New Orleans Co. v. Am. Beverage Co., 137 So. 
2d 298, 304-06 (La. 1962). 
152. Id at 306. 
153. See id. at 304. 
154. See id. at 305-06. 
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B. Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc. 
In the years after Dixie Drive it Yourself Louisiana's intermediate 
appellate courts applied its Duty/Risk approach to cases arising under 
statutes and to negligence cases where no statute was involved.'"' The 
Louisiana Supreme Court would not clearly apply the Duty/Risk 
method of analyzing negligence cases to a case where there was no 
alleged statutory violation until ten years after Dixie Drive It Yourself 
when it decided Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc.'56 In Hill, the court 
considered a garden-variety negligence case in which there was no 
claimed violation of a statute, and it applied the Duty/Risk analysis.'s 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Betsy, Baton Rouge scurried to 
repair itself before another storm hit.'"' Lundin & Associates was a 
home repair contractor and, in doing post-Betsy work, created a 
veritable assembly line of home repair.159 A Lundin crew and truck 
would deliver materials and tools to ajob site. 60 Later, workers would 
arrive by auto and do the required work.' 6 ' Thereafter, Lundin 
personnel would pick up what was left at the site.'6 2 Ms. Delouise hired 
Lundin to make repairs to her home.'6 3 After Lundin made the repairs 
to the Delouise home, it left a ladder leaning up against the side of the 
house.'6 4 At some point thereafter, some unknown person removed the 
ladder from the side of the house and laid it in the Delouise yard.' 65 
There it remained for several days,'6 6 like the gun in Anton Chekhov's 
first act.'67 
Celeste Hill worked as a housekeeper and babysitter for Ms. 
Delouise.'6 8 While on thejob, Ms. Hill went outside the Delouise home 
to hang up the wash. 6 9 As she walked to the clothesline, she saw the 
155. See Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 5, at 373-93. 
156. 256 So. 2d 620 (La. 1972). 
157. See id. at 621. 
158. Id 
159. Id 
160. Id 
161. Id 
162. Id 
163. Id 
164. Id 
165. Id 
166. Id 
167. Ars. G., IZ" VOSPOM[NHI GB" A.P. CHEKHOVIE [Reminisces of A.P. 
Checkhov], 28 Teatr i iskusstvo 520, 521 (1904) (Russ.) ("If in the first act you have hung a 
pistol on the wall, then in the following one it should be fired. Otherwise don't put it there."). 
168. Hill, 256 So. 2d at 621. 
169. Id. 
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ladder lying on the ground.'70 As she was hanging up the wash, she 
heard the door slam and saw her youngest charge, who was two or three 
years old, running toward her and the ladder."' Alarmed, she hurried to 
save the child from falling over the ladder and in the process fell over 
the very ladder from which she was trying to save the child, suffering 
injury in the fall.' 72 The proverbial Chekhovian gun had fired. 
Ms. Hill sued Ms. Delouise and Lundin, alleging negligence.'7 3 
The trial court held that Ms. Delouise was not at fault and, without 
deciding whether Lundin was negligent, concluded that Hill was 
contributorily negligent, and her recovery was thus barred under the 
law at the time.' 4 The court of appeal reversed as to Lundin, 
concluding it was negligent to leave a ladder at the site for several days 
and that it was foreseeable someone could be injured by the ladder. It 
also held that Ms. Hill was protected by the "momentary forgetfulness" 
doctrine that vitiated what would otherwise have been contributory 
negligence." 
Lundin applied for writs, which the Louisiana Supreme Court 
granted. 7 6 Justice Barham wrote the opinion for the court."' He began 
his negligence analysis with cause-in-fact, concluding that Lundin's 
leaving the ladder up against the side of the house was a cause-in-fact 
of the injury."' Clearly and properly, the court was following the 
Green/Malone prescription to treat cause-in-fact as a separate element 
of negligence.179 
Next, Justice Barham said "if the defendant's conduct of which 
the plaintiff complains is a cause in fact of the harm, we are then 
required in a determination of negligence to ascertain whether the 
170. Id 
171. Id 
172. Id 
173. Id 
174. Id 
175. Id 
176. Id 
177. Id 
178. Id at 622 ("If the defendant had not left the ladder on the premises, it could not 
have later been placed on the ground in the yard. To this extent it may be said that the 
defendant's act had something to do with the harm."). 
179. Cf GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, supra note 45, at 186-95 (discussing issues with 
causation); GREEN, RATIONALE ON PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 12, at 132-41 (discussing 
and distinguishing causation); Malone, Cause-in-Fact, supra note 1 (discussing cause-in-fact 
as separate from proximate cause). Arguably, there was also a certain amount of logic to 
starting the analysis with cause-in-fact because if there is no factual causation, then there is 
really no need to go any further, but the same logic would not necessarily apply in a case tried 
to ajury. Would the jury decide cause-in-fact before the judge decided duty? 
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defendant breached a legal duty imposed to protect against the 
particular risk involved."so As quoted, it is not entirely clear what 
Justice Barham meant. Was he saying that after cause-in-fact the court 
should decide breach? Or duty? 
As he continued, it became clear that he meant that after cause-in-
fact the court should consider the duty owed and its scope-scope of 
liability or risk.'"' He said: 
The basic question, then, is whether the risk of injury from a ladder lying 
on the ground, produced by a combination of defendant's act and that of 
a third party, is within the scope of protection of a rule of law which 
would prohibit leaving a ladder leaning against the house. 82 
Echoing Green's skepticism about relying on foreseeability to 
determine proximate cause or scope of liability, Justice Barham opined 
that foreseeability is "not always a reliable guide, and certainly it is not 
the only criterion for determining whether there is a duty-risk 
relationship."'83 One notes that in articulating that foreseeability was 
not the only factor in determining scope of liability, Justice Barham 
actually used the phrase "duty-risk."' But what else besides 
foreseeability did Justice Barham see as relevant to the scope of 
liability determination? "The ease of association of the injury with the 
rule relied upon, however, is always a proper inquiry."'s The phrase 
"ease of association" is downright literary. It is evocative. What it 
means is less clear. Over the years, I have come to realize that it means 
that the court, in determining scope of liability, should consider how 
easily one would associate the risk, which arose, with the particular 
alleged negligent act.' 86 That is, if the defendant was negligent-i.e., 
allegedly breached the duty to exercise reasonable care-to leave a 
180. Hill, 256 So. 2d at 622. Interestingly, he cited two articles by Leon Green in 
addition to a Louisiana Supreme Court decision. See id. at 548; Leon Green, Duties, Risks, 
Causation Doctrines, 41 TEX. L. REV. 42 (1962); Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in 
Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543 (1962). 
181. Most accumtely, he did discuss breach but did not decide the question; he assumed 
that leaving a ladder leaning up against the side of a house might, under some circumstances, 
pose an unreasonable risk of harm. Hill, 256 So. 2d at 622. 
182. Id 
183. Id 
184. Id 
185. Id After this sentence Justice Barham cites WLLIAMPROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE 
LAW OF TORTS 282ff (3d ed. 1964), but the phrase does not appear in Prosser. One of the 
footnotes on the cited page is a laudable reference to Leon Green and his notion that the real 
issue of proximate cause is a legal issue based on policy. Id 282 n2 (citing Leon Green, 
Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEX. L. REV. 471, 621, 755 (1950)). 
186. The so-called "rule of law." 
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ladder leaning up against the side of a house; would a 
housekeeper/babysitter falling over the ladder after a third party had 
moved the ladder be one of the risks that come to mind?' 
What, in addition to ease of association, should the court consider 
in deciding scope of liability or scope of duty? 
Where the rule of law upon which a plaintiff relies for imposing a duty 
is based upon a statute, the court attempts to interpret legislative intent as 
to the risk contemplated by the legal duty, which is often a resort to the 
court's own judgment of the scope of protection intended by the 
Legislature. Where the rule of law is jurisprudential and the court is 
without the aid of legislative intent, the process of determinmig the risk 
encompassed within the rule of law is nevertheless similar. The same 
policy considerations which would motivate a legislative body to impose 
duties to protect from certain risks are applied by the court in making its 
determination.'s 
The paragraph merits some breaking down. Initially, in the first 
sentence, Justice Barham analogizes the garden-variety negligence 
case to the violation of statute negligence case.18 9 In a violation of 
statute case the court asks questions one and two about class of persons 
and class of risks. Per Justice Barham, in a garden-variety case where 
the issue involves a jurisprudential "rule of law" the process is the 
same.' 90 But, as noted above the idea of a jurisprudential rule of law is 
somewhat misleading because really what it translates to is the 
particular factual negligence the plaintiff alleged.' 9' Be that as it may, 
the court then, per Green, Malone, and Hill, should turn the plaintiff's 
particular alleged negligent act into a "rule of law" and decide whether 
that "rule of law" includes the risk that occurred in the case. I tell my 
class it is a sort of "write your own statute" exercise. 
Clearly, per Barham, Green, and Malone, once the hypothetical 
statute or rule of law is hypothetically enacted (by the court?), then the 
judge decides the scope of liability in light of the relevant policies.' 92 
While Justice Barham does not expressly list these policies, one might 
intuit that they are the same policies Green articulated as relevant to the 
scope of liability decision: the administrative factor, the ethical or 
moral factor, the economic factor, the prophylactic or preventive factor, 
187. Of course, foreseeability might well sneak into this inquiry. 
188. Hill, 256 So. 2d at 622-23 (citations omitted). 
189. Id. at 622. 
190. Id. at 623. 
191. See, e.g., Pokorav. WabashRy. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1934). 
192. See Hill, 256 So. 2d at 623. 
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and the justice factor, including the capacity to bear the loss.' 93 So then, 
what did the Hill court decide? 
This defendant's alleged misconduct, its alleged breach of duty, 
was in leaving the ladder leaning against the house unattended. The risk 
encountered by the plaintiff which caused her harm was the ladder lying 
on the ground where it was placed by another, over which she tripped as 
she moved to protect the child. The record is devoid of any evidence 
tending to establish that the defendant could have reasonably anticipated 
that a third person would move the ladder and put it in the position which 
created this risk, or that such a "naked possibility" was an unreasonable 
risk of harm. 
A rule of law which would impose a duty upon one not to leave a 
ladder standing against a house does not encompass the risk here 
encountered. We are of the opinion that the defendant was under no duty 
to protect this plaintiff from the risk which gave rise to her injuries. The 
plaintiff has failed to establish legal and actionable negligence on the part 
of the defendant.1 9 4 
First, one is struck by the fact that the core of the decision seems to be 
that there was no evidence that the defendant could have anticipated 
someone moving the ladder and placing it in the plaintiff's ultimate 
path.1 9 5 Of course, "anticipated" is a synonym for foreseeable. 
Ironically, Justice Barham had earlier pointed out that foreseeability 
was not always a reliable guide to determine scope of liability.1 96 
Apparently, foreseeability was a sufficiently reliable guide for the 
decision in Hill. Second, a critic might also lament that the court did 
not undertake to meaningfully apply or explain the ease of association 
inquiry after introducing it. 19 The court might have indicated that one 
would associate the risk of someone, perhaps a child, falling off a 
ladder left leaning up against the side of a house, but not so much a 
phantom moving the ladder and someone tripping over it. Third, after 
noting that the determination of scope of liability involved a policy 
193. See GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, supra note 45, at 74-152. One commentator, 
McNamara, lists the following: "(1) ease of association, (2) administrative considemtions, 
(3) economic considerations, (4) moral considemtions, (5) type of activity, and (6) precedent 
or historical considemtions." Supra note 86, at 1234. 
194. Hill, 256 So. 2d at 623 (citations omitted) (quoting Lanza Enters., Inc. v. Cont'l 
Ins. Co., 129 So. 2d 91, 94 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961)). 
195. See id. 
196. See id. at 622. 
197. Cf Jones v. Robbins, 289 So. 2d 104, 107 (La. 1974) ("Particularly included within 
the risk of harm to others is the fact that, with the expectation of child group play, an easily 
associated risk is that some other incompetent, by reason of tender age, would misbehave or 
would misuse the gasoline."). 
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analysis, there is absolutely no policy analysis. Perhaps the lack of 
policy discussion or analysis is inevitable in a garden-variety 
negligence case, but if so, there are implications for the contention that 
the judge, rather than the fact finder, should decide scope of liability in 
a garden-variety negligence case. I will discuss these implications 
below. Fourth, whether the scope of liability would, in fact, always be 
a legal issue for the court, as Green and Malone contended,' 98 was not 
crystal clear because, like Dixie Drive It Yourself Hill was not a jury 
case.' 99 It was tried by the court. 
Happily, the court maintained the separation of cause-in-fact from 
scope of liability.2 00 And happily, the court did not resort to the mumbo 
jumbo words of proximate cause. For instance, Justice Barham did not 
say that Lundin leaving the ladder against the side of the house was not 
the proximate cause of Hill's injury because whoever moved the ladder 
and laid it down was an intervening cause, which rose to the level of a 
superseding cause, which broke the chain of causation.20 ' Nor did the 
court rely upon the sequence of events or say that Lundin's negligence 
was "passive" or that the negligence of whomever moved the ladder 
was the "sole" proximate cause of Hill's injuries. 
The analysis in Hill ended at the scope of duty or liability stage 
because there was no need to proceed.202 But what if Justice Barham 
had concluded that the defendant's duty did include the risk that 
occurred? Then, presumably, the fact finder would have had to decide 
whether Lundin had breached the appropriate standard of care-had 
Lundin behaved unreasonably under the circumstances? Put 
differently, was there, or should there be, a "rule of law" that one should 
not leave a ladder leaning up against the side of a house?203 And, lastly, 
if the fact finders decided there was a breach, they would decide the 
damages issue. 
We may chart the allocation of decision-making authority in a 
negligence case under Duty/Risk after Hill as follows: 
198. See, e.g., GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 12, at 76-77; 
Malone, Cause-in-Fact, supra note 1, at 72. 
199. See Hill, 256 So. 2d at 621. 
200. See id. at 622. 
201. Id. at 622-23. 
202. Id at 623. 
203. Louisiana courts have had a tendency since Hill to conflate duty and breach. See, 
e.g, Pitre v. La. Tech Univ., 95-1466, 95-1487, pp. 9-22 (La. 5/10/96); 673 So. 2d 585, 590-
96. That unfortunate tendency deserves fuller and separate treatment. 
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Element Who Decides 
Cause-in-Fact Jury 
Duty/Risk Judge 
Breach Jury 
Damages Jury 
With the decision in Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Duty/Risk was 
enshrined as "the" Louisiana approach to negligence, whether the case 
involved a violation of a statute or not. Under the Duty/Risk approach, 
cause-in-fact and scope of liability were separated. The judge would or 
should consider the relevant policies in making the Duty/Risk decision. 
And courts would concomitantly avoid the mumbo jumbo magic word 
approach to negligence that characterized the pre-Green/Malone 
approach to and analysis of negligence. Except perhaps for having the 
judge decide scope of liability, the future seemed bright.204 
Sadly, the next Part will blunt the optimism Hill portended. It will 
discuss the post-Hill development of negligence analysis in Louisiana, 
the lack of policy analysis in most garden-variety negligence cases, and 
the inconsistency that has ensued. As noted, I once praised this 
inconsistency as "flexibility."2 05 I was wrong. Dave Robertson, who 
urged a more consistent approach with the jury deciding scope of 
liability, was right.206 Now I am convinced. The consistent analytical, 
policy-based, transparent approach to negligence that Hill 
foreshadowed never materialized. And judges are not the appropriate 
institutional actor to decide scope of liability in a garden-variety fact-
specific negligence case; juries are. Or in a non-jury trial-an 
increasingly common phenomenon-the judge should decide scope of 
liability, but as a mixed question of fact and law, not as a question of 
law. This point is crucial when a defendant moves for summary 
judgment20 7 contending that the defendant's duty did not include the 
risk that occurred. 
204. And there are still cases applying the Hill formula and its allocation of decision-
making responsibility. See, e.g., Pardue v. AT&T Tel. Co., 2001-0762, pp. 2-5 (La. App. 3d 
Cir. 10/3 1/0 1); 799 So. 2d 710, 712-14. 
205. Galligan, Cats or Gardens, supra note 20, at 35; Galligan, Revisiting the Patterns 
ofNegligence, supra note 20, at 1132. 
206. See, e.g., Robertson, Allocating Authority, supra note 19, at 1102-05. Or, in a case 
with no july, the judge as fact finder should decide scope of liability. But that decision is not 
law; it is a mixed question of fact and law with no precedential value. 
207. FED. R. CIv. P. 56; LA. CODE CIv. PROC. art. 966 (2020). 
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If scope of liability is properly a mixed question of fact and law, 
then judges should not grant summary judgment if there are material 
facts concerning the scope of the defendant's liability (or duty) and 
reasonable minds could find that the indicated risk was within the scope 
of liability as a basic question of fairness or common sense.2 08 The court 
should not turn the scope of liability determination into a question of 
law at the summary judgment phase and either ignore or decide critical 
factual issues. Doing so misallocates decision-making authority and 
creates what looks like legal decisions that litter and confuse the 
landscape of Louisiana tort law. If there are factual209 issues concerning 
the scope of liability, the question is not appropriate for resolution at 
the summary judgment stage. If there are no factual questions, the court 
should grant summary judgment on the scope of liability question, not 
the duty question. 
V. DUTY/RISK DERAILED 
The purpose of this Part is not to exhaustively review post-Hill v. 
Lundin & Associates, Inc. negligence law in Louisiana. Rather, it is to 
point out broad trends and to point out how the Duty/Risk method of 
analysis has not, in some ways, fulfilled its promise. In this Part, I show 
that courts have not consistently articulated policy bases of their 
decisions when deciding scope of liability or scope of duty.210 The 
failure to analyze and discuss policy in such cases is because the results 
in garden-variety negligence cases generally turn on case-specific 
fairness, not policy. Thus, fact finders, not judges, are the appropriate 
institutional actors to determine scope of liability or risk. 
A. The Promise ofFact-Specific Policy Analyses Was Illusory 
Green and Malone contended that courts deciding scope of 
liability or scope of duty had to make a policy choice about the scope 
of the "rule" upon which the plaintiff relied.2 1' As noted above, Green 
articulated the relevant policies: the administrative factor, the ethical or 
moral factor, the economic factor, the prophylactic or preventive factor, 
208. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56; LA. CODE CIv. PROC. art 966(A)(3). 
209. Including mixed questions of fact and law. 
210. The Louisiana Supreme Court has said that it would make tort decision "in light of 
all [the] relevant moral, economic, and social considerations," Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 
1146, 1147 (La. 1983) (determining whether something posed an unreasonable risk of hann), 
and sometimes, but certainly not always, did not apply those factors. 
211. See, e.g, Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 5, at 363-64. 
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and the justice factor, including the capacity to bear the loss.2 12 There 
are several excellent Louisiana Supreme Court opinions discussing 
these general tort policies, and some of these cases are discussed below 
in the proposal Part. However, it is important to note that those 
Louisiana decisions, for the most part, involve cases and rules dealing 
with "whole categories of claimants or . .. claims,"213 not cases dealing 
with discrete, isolated allegations of negligent conduct. 
In cases involving more discrete, less categorical claims, it is not 
uncommon to see little or no analysis of the policies Green identified 
as critical. I have come to believe this is inevitable as grand policy often 
has little or no role to play at the fact-specific level of determining 
whether it is fair to hold someone liable for injuries they have factually 
caused. For instance, in Jones v. Robbins, the defendant sold or gave a 
small amount of gasoline to a six-year-old child.2 14 A group of children, 
including the direct recipient of the gas, played with the gasoline, 
pretending to have paint on their hands and washing their hands with 
the gasoline.2 15 About one and one-half hours after the six-year-old 
obtained the gas, her four-year-old half-sister, with a match in hand, 
came upon the scene of the playing children.216 The four-year-old 
struck the match, threw it into the gasoline, was subsequently engulfed 
in flames, and suffered injury.217 Her father sued the owner and 
manager of the store where the six-year-old had obtained the gas.218 
The trial court held for the defendants and the court of appeal 
affirmed.21 9 The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed.220 
In Jones, Justice Barham, the author of Hill, again began the 
analysis with cause-in-fact, concluding that the defendant was a cause-
in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries.22 ' Then, he turned to duty, breach, and 
scope of duty.222 On the duty and breach questions he said: 
As a general statement, it may be said that the vendor of gasoline has the 
duty not to place it in the hands of those who, by reason of age or other 
212. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, supra note 45, at 74-152. 
213. Pite v. La. Tech Univ., 95-1466, 95-1487, p. 1 (La. 5/10/96); 673 So. 2d 585, 596 
(La. 1996) (Lennon, J., concurring). 
214. 289 So. 2d 104, 106 (La. 1974). 
215. Id 
216. Id 
217. Id 
218. Id at 105-06. 
219. Id at 108. 
220. Id 
221. Id at 106. 
222. Id at 106-08. 
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disabilities, are unaware of the special propensities of the material, and 
ofthe precautionary measures which must be taken when using or storing 
it. Under the particular facts of this case, when a six year old child comes 
alone to a service station attendant and procures gasoline, without any 
adult solicitation or any adult supervision, it may be said that the 
attendant has breached a duty imposed by a standard of care owed to at 
least the one to whom he has dispensed the gasoline.22 3 
Turning to scope of duty, Justice Barham asked whether the duty not to 
provide gasoline to a six-year-old child encompassed the risk her four-
year-old half-sister would suffer burn injuries. 224 
The court concluded that the duty not to provide gasoline to an 
underage person included the risk that had occurred in the case.225 
Why? Because children play together, and thus the risk of injury from 
fire was easily associated with the duty.226 Moreover, while he did not 
use the word, he essentially concluded that the occurrence was 
foreseeable.22 7 What policy analysis was there? 
The duty not to place gasoline in the hands of an unsupervised 
incompetent six year old was designed not only to protect that child, but 
also to protect those whom she would likely expose to the danger of the 
highly flammable substance. Moreover, it included the risk that another 
incompetent of tender age might engage in an activity of misuse which 
would actually ignite the gasoline and create the harm which the four 
year old Candy here suffered.228 
The opinion does not expressly consider any of the policies which 
Green contended should be at the heart of the scope of duty analysis. 22 9 
Arguably, the opinion hints at notions of deterrence-the law should 
deter adults from providing dangerous substances to children_230 but 
the opinion did not expressly articulate or apply any of Green's 
223. Id. at 107. Interestingly, he analyzed duty and breachbefore scope of duty; whereas 
in Hill he conflated the duty and scope of duty questions. See Hill v. Lundin & Assocs., 256 
So. 2d 620, 622-23 (La. 1972). Thus, in Jones he essentially switched the order of analysis, 
which phenomenon I will discuss below. 
224. Jones, 289 So. 2d at 107-08. 
225. Id at 108. 
226. Id at 107. 
227. Id at 107-08 (holding that the risk was "totally within the range of the attendant's 
realization of the consequences of his act"). 
228. Id at 108. Interestingly, the dissent relies on pre-Greenian proximate cause 
concepts like "shifting the responsibility" to the mother of the child and the passage of time 
between the provision of the gas and the bum injuries. Id at 108-10 (Summers, J., dissenting). 
229. For a poetic take on Jones, see Thomas E. Richard, Jones v. Robbins: The Rhyme 
andReason ofDuty-Risk, 74 LA. L. REv. 839 (2014). 
230. See Jones, 289 So. 2d at 107-08. 
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policies. Nor does it plumb in-depth policies related to who should be 
responsible for supervision and oversight of children, although an 
analysis of that issue would once again seem to turn on the particular 
facts of the particular case before the court. 
Likewise, in Gresham v. Davenport, a fifteen-year-old girl, who 
lived with her father, hosted a party at her father's house.23 ' At the party, 
she served beer to her guests, including her sixteen-year-old 
boyfriend.232 Neither young person was a "novice to beer drinking." 23 3 
Over the course of the evening, the young man drank ten beers.234 On 
the way home, the boyfriend, who was not driving, grabbed the wheel 
of the car in which he was traveling in order to avoid hitting some 
mailboxes. 235 Consequently, the driver lost control of the car.236 The 
driver was killed and two other passengers suffered serious injuries in 
the ensuing collision.2 37 The parents of two of the victims sued the girl's 
father and his insurers, among others.23 8 
One of the questions the court considered was whether the girl 
owed a duty not to serve beer to her boyfriend. 239 The court doubted 
that the girl had a duty not to serve beer to her boyfriend. 24 0 But, even 
if a duty was owed: 
the particular risk encountered by serving beer to [the boyfriend], a 
passenger in a vehicle, that he would grab the steering wheel and cause 
an accident cannot be easily associated with [the girlfriend's] conduct in 
providing the beer. Moreover, there is no indication that such a risk was 
within the legislative intent in passing the statute prohibiting a minor 
from purchasing alcoholic beverages. Therefore, the particular risk was 
not within the scope of whatever duty that [the girlfriend], a minor 
herself, might have owed to [her boyfriend].241 
That is the extent of the analysis. There was no ease of association 
between any duty owed and the risk that occurred; what happened was 
apparently just too bizarre.242 But that does not seem like a legal 
231. 537 So. 2d 1144, 1144 (La. 1989). 
232. Id at 1144-45 
233. Id at 1147. 
234. Id at 1145-46. 
235. d at 1145. 
236. Id 
237. Id 
238. Id 
239. Id at 1147. 
240. Id 
241. Id at 1147-48. 
242. See id. 
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determination. It seems like a mixed question of law and fact and is 
totally fact-specific.243 Once again, the opinion, when considering 
scope of the duty, does not undertake or express any analysis of policy 
at all. 
Roberts v. Benoit,244 particularly on rehearing, exemplified the 
same trend of little or no analysis of the core policies of tort law. Benoit 
was a cook working for the Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office.2 45 The 
Sheriff commissioned the kitchen workers as deputy sheriffs in order 
to make them eligible for state supplemental pay.2 4 6 Before 
commissioning the workers, the sheriff provided a training course, 
which included eight hours of firearms training.2 47 During the training, 
the instructor told the future (kitchen-based) deputies "that while off 
duty, it was better to have a gun and not need it than to need a gun and 
not have it."2 48 The instructors also provided the prospective deputies 
with departmental regulations that they should not have a gun on their 
person when consuming alcohol.2 49 
After commissioning, Benoit, who had been drinking, went to 
Roberts' home to have Roberts repair his car. While at Roberts' home, 
Benoit took a .38 revolver out of its holster and began playing with it 
for a forty-five-minute period, including cocking and uncocking the 
gun.250 Roberts asked Benoit to put the gun away several times. Benoit 
did not comply.2 5' Thereafter, the revolver discharged, seriously 
injuring Roberts.25 2 Roberts sued Benoit, the Sheriff, and others.253 
The case involved issues of potential vicarious liability and 
negligent hiring, commissioning, and training.254 It wound its way up 
to the Louisiana Supreme Court.255 The court, in its first opinion by 
243. And if one focused on the broad risks of drunken underage children doing all 
manner of stupid and dangerous things, perhaps the general risk of tragic mayhem includes the 
particular, bizarre behavior of grabbing a steering wheel. I would leave that up to lawyers to 
argue and juries to decide, and each case would stand on its own facts. 
244. 605 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1992). 
245. Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1035 (La. 1991), on reh'g, 605 So. 2d 1032 
(La. 1992). 
246. Id. 
247. Id 
248. Id 
249. Id Apparently, it was better to not have a gun when one needed it if one had been 
drinking than to have a gun when one needed it if one had been drinking. 
250. Id at 1035-36. 
251. Id at 1036. 
252. Id 
253. Id at 1035. 
254. Id at 1036. 
255. Id 
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Justice Hall, considered the law related to negligent hiring in other 
jurisdictions and expressly recognized the tort of negligent hiring in 
Louisiana.2 56 But, was the risk, which occurred, within the scope of the 
duty? Echoing Green, Justice Hall said: 
There is no "rule" for determining the scope of the duty. Regardless if 
stated in terms of proximate cause, legal cause, or duty, the scope of the 
duty inquiry is ultimately a question of policy as to whether the particular 
risk falls within the scope of the duty.... These cases require logic, 
reasoning and policy decisions be employed to determine whether 
liability should be imposed under the particular factual circumstances 
presented.257 
Justice Hall then stated that the court found that the ease of 
association between the duty to properly train deputies and the injuries, 
which occurred, and the manner in which they occurred was 
"attenuated."2 58 There was no requirement that Benoit carry a firearm 
even if it was encouraged; Benoit's carrying the gun while drinking 
violated the Sheriff's regulations; and Benoit's engaging in horseplay 
with the revolver, while intoxicated, violated common sense.259 Nor 
was there anything in Benoit's background or experience to predict 
what occurred; thus, the incident was not foreseeable to the Sheriff.260 
Moreover, Benoit met Roberts in a purely personal capacity; it was not 
related to his employment.261 Justice Hall concluded his analysis by 
saying: 
After carefully delineating the duty, it is evident that the primary purpose 
for imposing the duty to exercise reasonable care in hiring, 
commissioning and training deputies is to ensure effective and efficient 
law enforcement, and also to protect the public from injury caused by a 
deputy's negligent use of firearms while engaged in his law enforcement 
duties. The risk that a deputy while off duty and under no requirement to 
carry a gun would engage in horseplay with a loaded revolver while 
intoxicated, an action in violation of the Sheriff's regulations, and cause 
injury to plaintiff is clearly outside the ambit of protection contemplated 
262 by the imposition of that duty.
256. Id at 1038-40, 1043-44. 
257. Id at 1044-45. 
258. Id at 1045. 
259. Id 
260. Id 
261. Id at 1046. 
262. Id 
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The quote reveals a concern for deterrence-to deter the police from 
negligent use of firearms when engaged in law enforcement 
activities. 63 The rest of the analysis described above is common sense 
logic, not policy.2 64 And the decision was fact-dependent: the fact the 
Sheriff did not require Benoit to carry a gun; the fact Benoit violated a 
regulation by carrying a firearm when intoxicated; the stupidity of 
playing with a loaded gun while drunk; and the lack of foreseeability 
are unique to the case.2 65 
There were three spirited dissents from the court's first opinion in 
Roberts, and the court granted rehearing.2 6 6 On rehearing, Justice Cole 
wrote the opinion of the court.2 67 Justice Cole began as a true believer 
in Duty/Risk, noting: 
Defining legal or proximate cause has proved to be a herculean task for 
the judiciary in all places and all times. The very term "proximate cause" 
is fraught with confusion, as it has nothing to do either with cause or 
proximity. Moreover, it is not to be mistaken for cause-in-fact, as the two 
elements satisfy entirely different functions in the negligence analysis. 2 68 
Then, after a historical discussion of proximate cause and Duty/Risk,2 69 
Justice Cole turned to the case before the court and said: 
In our original opinion we stated the sheriff has a duty to commission as 
deputies only competent law enforcement officers. Upon 
reconsideration, we find that the duty implicated by this case is actually 
much narrower, viz., the duty not to promote a cook to deputy in name 
alone, that is, not to engage in ersatz promotions.270 
The purpose of that duty was not to protect against personal injury but 
to protect the public fisc. 271 Interestingly, as Justice Cole continued, he 
began to shift terms and call the scope of duty issue a "legal cause" 
272 issue. 
In subsequently defining the issue and denying recovery, Justice 
Cole wrote: 
263. See id. 
264. See id. 
265. See id 
266. See id at 1046-50. 
267. Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1050 (La. 1992). 
268. Id at 1052. 
269. Id at 1052-54. 
270. Id at 1054. 
271. Id 
272. Id 
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In this case, the inquiry becomes whether the duty not to promote a cook 
to deputy, in name only, is meant to protect the class of claimants, of 
which plaintiff is a member, from the risk that the cook will: acquire, of 
his own accord, the trappings of a deputy; while off-duty, become 
intoxicated; play games with his loaded gun; and, in the process, 
inadvertently shoot someone. We do not think the duty encompasses 
such a far-flung hazard, dependent as it is on the unpredictable and 
idiosyncratic foibles of one person. While it is not necessary that the 
exact risk encountered be foreseeable, it is unrealistic to expect the 
sheriff, who promoted Benoit simply to put him on the supplemental pay 
rolls, could have expected any harm to result from this maneuver. The 
facts indicate that what little training Benoit received, he received as a 
matter of form alone.273 
The reader will note how incredibly fact specifically Justice Cole 
articulated the scope of duty or legal cause (Duty/Risk) question. 274 The 
reader will also notice that the ultimate basis for the no liability 
determination was that the incident, as it occurred, was 
unforeseeable.27 5 Continuing, Justice Cole emphasized the "fact-
intensive nature of the duty-risk analysis." 276 The opinion, whether one 
agrees with the result or not, is a fine example of traditional legal 
reasoning. Justice Cole, as Justice Hall had done in the original opinion, 
reviewed the jurisprudence and attempted to garner and hone the reach 
of the duty to train. But there is a noteworthy absence of any express 
analysis of "policy" as Green defined it. 
In Cay v. State Department of Transportation & Development, a 
man, wearing black, who had been drinking, and who was walking on 
a bridge with traffic at his back at night, fell to his death.2 77 His 
survivors sued the state, claiming that the state breached its duty to 
exercise reasonable care because it had not designed the height of the 
bridge guardrail to the height required by law for bridges on which 
pedestrians traveled.2 78 While there were no witnesses to the fall and no 
signs a vehicle had hit decedent, the most plausible inferences were that 
a car coming up behind him had scared him and that, in an intoxicated 
state, he had staggered and fallen over the low guardrail.27 9 
273. Id at 1054-55. 
274. See id. 
275. See id. 
276. Id at 1055. 
277. 93-0887 (La. 1/14/94); 631 So. 2d 393, 394. 
278. Id at 395. 
279. Id at 397. 
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In a careful and typically clear opinion, Justice Lemmon 
considered, among other issues, the scope of duty issue. He discussed 
the general risk at issue and concluded: "There is an ease of association 
between an accidental fall over the railing of a bridge and the failure to 
build the railing to a height above an average person's center of 
gravity."28 The opinion is sensible and unassailable, but, once again, 
there is no discussion of Greenian policy. Interestingly, the court did 
reallocate fault from 60% to the defendant and 40% to the decedent to 
10% to the defendant and 90% to the decedent.2 8' Thus, the opinion is, 
in part, about the role of liability, victim fault, and the impact of 
comparative negligence after its adoption.2 82 
In the twenty-five years since these decisions, the courts continue 
to state that the scope of duty question is fact-specific and, at the same 
time, that it is a policy decision.283 But the courts, in deciding the scope 
280. Id. at 399. 
281. Id 
282. That is, rather than find no liability to an at fault victim through the Duty/Risk 
method, the court found liability but allocated the lion's share of the fault to the decedent. 
283. See, e.g., Rando v. Anco Insulations, Inc., 2008-1163, 2008-1169, pp. 38-40 (La. 
5/22/09); 16 So. 3d 1065, 1092-93; Chaissonv. Avondale Indus., Inc., 2005-1511, pp. 24-26 
(La. App. 4th Cir. 12/20/06); 947 So.2d 171, 188-89; Conerly v. State ex rel. La. State 
Penitentiary, 2002-1852, pp. 11-12 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/27/03); 858 So. 2d636,646-47; Perkins 
v. Entergy Corp., 98-2081, 98-2082, 98-2083, pp. 30-35 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/99); 756 So. 
2d 388, 409-13; Pinsonneault v. Merchs. & Farmers Bank & Tr. Co., 99-12, pp. 13-22 (La. 
App. 3d Cir. 7/21/99); 738 So. 2d 172, 181-86 (discussing thoroughly jurisprudence, the facts, 
and logic but without a "Greenian" policy analysis); Nicholson v. Calcasieu Par. Police Jury, 
96-314, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 3d Cir. 12/11/96); 685 So. 2d 507, 511-12; Rhodes v. State ex rel. 
Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 94-1758, pp. 12-13 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/20/96); 684 So. 2d 1134, 
1144; Freemanv. Julia Place Ltd. Partners, 95-0243, pp. 4-6 (La. App. 4th Cir. 10/26/95); 663 
So. 2d 515, 518-19 (foreseeability); cf Cormierv. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 98-2208, p. 9 (La. 9/8/99); 
745 So. 2d 1, 8-9 (noting that liability on the state would create too onerous a burden); Phillips 
v. G & H Seed Co., 2010-1405, p. 12 (La. App. 3d Cir. 5/11/11); 66 So. 3d 507, 515 (quoting 
FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAs C. GALLIGAN, JR., LOUISIANA TORT LAW 132-33 (1996)) 
(noting the policies at issue in an economic harm negligence case). Sometimes the court has 
taken a more middle of the road approach between a fact-specific inquiry and a policy analysis. 
For instance, in Maw Enterprises LLC v. City of Marksville, the court considered whether a 
city's duty to provide a retail alcohol beverage permit to a qualified applicant encompassed the 
risk that the applicant's lessor would suffer economic loss if the city improperly denied the 
lessee-applicant a permit and thereby harmed the business. 2014-0090, p. 2 (La. 9/3/14); 149 
So. 3d 210, 212-13. After first considering whether the city had a duty under the applicable 
state alcohol laws, the court considered whether the city had a duty under LA. CIV. CODE art. 
2315 (2020). Id at p. 11-19, 149 So. 3d at 217-22. In holding the duty did not encompass the 
risk, the court phrased the duty and scope of duty question in a fact-specific manner. Id. at p. 
17, 149 So. 3d at 221. In concluding there was not liability, the court noted the case-specific 
facts but also referred generally to "momal, social, and economic values." Id at p. 18, 149 So. 
3d at 221-22. Then, it rather summarily uttered concerns about unlimited liability to an 
unlimited number and articulated hypothetical concerns about liability for employees losing 
theirjobs and damage to suppliers. Id at p. 18-19, 149 So. 3d at 222 (quoting PPG Indus., Inc. 
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of the duty or risk, do not typically discuss the administration ofjustice 
or the judicial role, the ethical or moral factor-other than a pure sense 
of fairness, deterrence, or the capacity to bear the loss.284 A 2017 
Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision evincing this 
reality is Chanthasalo v. Deshotel.28 5 
Deshotel rear-ended Chanthasalo on the interstate; the parties 
subsequently pulled over to inspect the damage and to report the 
v. Bean Dredging, 447 So. 2d 1058, 1061 (La. 1984)). It then referred to its "policy" decision 
in the case. Id. Notably, there was no empirical evidence offered for the court's economic 
concerns. See id. 
284. See, e.g, Cleco Co.v. Johnson, 2001-0175, p.7 (La. 9/18/01); 795 So. 2d 302, 307 
("If it is foreseeable that damage to electrical lines could cause a power outage and a resulting 
automobile accident, a trier of fact may conclude that it is foreseeable that such damage could 
cause a power surge which would harm electrical customers' equipment."); Carpenter v. 
Foremost Signature Ins. Co., 47,008, pp. 8-9 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2/29/12); 87 So. 3d 264, 269 
(holding that interruption of water service was not the legal cause of fire damage three days 
later); Bruno v. Davis, 2009-928, p. 3 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2/24/10); 31 So. 3d 633, 635 
("Although the exact manner in which Plaintiff came to harm may not have been foreseeable, 
it was, and is obvious that an elderly person lying quietly in bed might be suddenly confused 
and disoriented by a vehicle crashing into her house. The particular harm whichbefell Plaintiff, 
while unusual, can be reasonably said to be associated with the sudden event caused by the 
chain of events that resulted from Richard Davis' negligence in opemting his vehicle."); 
Stephenson v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Ins. Co., 2004-1237, pp. 8-10 (La. App. 3d Cir. 
2/2/05); 893 So.2d 180, 186-87 (holding that any duty a school and its soccer coach owed to 
prevent a player from participating in a soccer match because of left ankle injury, which was 
properly braced, did not include the risk that the player would sustain injury to her right leg 
because of an unsuccessful maneuver by an opposing player); Franz v. LeDoux, 2003-2080, 
p. 5 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2/4/04); 869 So. 2d 137, 140-41 (holding that there was no ease of 
association between a fall from a piece of exercise equipment and a motor vehicle accident one 
month later); Pardue v. AT&T Tel. Co., 2001-0762, p. 5 (La. App. 3d Cir. 10/31/01); 799 So. 
2d 710, 713-14 (quoting Todd v. State ex rel. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 96-3090, p. 7 (La. 9/9/97); 
699 So. 2d 35, 39) (holding that there is no ease of association between alleged negligent 
maintenance of a power line and a squirrel gaining access to a transformer casing a power 
outage which damages plaintiff's cordless phone); Barr v. Jacobson, 34,975, p. 5 (La. App. 2d 
Cir. 9/28/01); 795 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (holding that the danger of stepping into holes located off 
of the roadway while embarking ona second trip to observe othervehicles or persons involved, 
out of curiosity or personal interest, six or seven minutes after the accident, is simply not within 
the scope of this duty). 
285. 2017-0521 (La. App. 4th Cir. 12/27/17); 234 So. 3d 1103; see also Cleco, 2001-
0 175, p. 7; 795 So. 2d at 307 (holding that a dump truck driver's duty to not negligently back 
into a utility pole included the risk that customers of the utility would suffer damage to their 
electrical appliances as the result of a power surge by relying upon foreseeability and case 
analysis with no discussion of policy); LeBlanc v. Stevenson, 2000-0157, p. 5 (La. 10/17/00); 
770 So. 2d 766, 771 (detailing a sad tale of two men trying to get a truck out of the mud, an 
amputated finger, and no discussion of policy); Todd, 96-3090 at p. 17; 699 So. 2d at 43-44 
(relying upon foreseeability in concluding that the risk an eleven-year-old boy would commit 
suicide at his father's house after being removed from his mother by the Department of Social 
Services during an investigation into child abuse initiated by teachers of the decedent who saw 
bruises on him was not within the scope of the State's duty to conduct an investigation of the 
matter). 
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accident to the police.28 6 Approximately five to fifteen minutes later, 
another party rear-ended another car as they passed by the site of the 
initial accident.287 Those two cars then struck both Chanthasalo and 
Deshotel.28 8 Chanthasalo sustained serious injuries as a result of the 
second accident.28 9 He sued Deshotel, among others.2 90 Chanthasalo 
contended that Deshotel's alleged substandard conduct was the cause 
of the injuries he suffered as a result of the second accident.2 9' 
Deshotel's insurer filed a motion for summary judgment in which it 
contended that the scope of duty owed by Deshotel to Chanthasalo did 
not extend to the remote possibility that he might be struck by a vehicle 
in a separate, unrelated accident.2 92 
The trial court granted the motion, and the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed.293 The court very appropriately discussed the reasons why 
drivers should not follow too closely and the risks that following the 
car ahead entails.2 9 4 It then concluded by stating: 
[W]e find no ease of association between Accident No. 1 and Accident 
No. 2.... The duty Ms. Deshotel owed to Mr. Chanthasalo from the first 
accident-not to follow too closely and drive at a safe speed-did not 
extend to cover him for the risk of injury from an unrelated second 
accident.295 
It is a classic Duty/Risk decision based on common sense and a 
purposeful analysis of the rule-not to follow too closely-and the 
reason for the rule. It is also extremely fact-specific, and it is not an 
analysis of the "policies" of tort law. For what policies, other than basic 
fairness, are at play in such a case? None. 
B. Scope of Liability in a Particular Case Is About Fairness, Not 
Policy, and It Is a Mixed Question of Fact and Law for the Fact 
Finder; It Is Not a Question ofLaw for the Court 
If it appears that I am being critical of the opinions described in 
the previous subpart, let me clarify. Many of them are technically and 
286. Chanthasalo, 2017-0521 atp. 1; 234 So. 3d at 1105. 
287. Id 
288. Id 
289. Id 
290. Id at p. 2, 234 So. 3d at 1105. 
291. Id 
292. Id 
293. Id at pp. 3, 12; 234 So. 3d at 1106, 1111. 
294. Id at pp. 9-10; 234 So. at 1109-10. 
295. Id at p. 10, 234 So. 3d at 1110. 
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analytically excellent opinions. They discuss jurisprudence; they are 
purposive in analyzing the reason for the so-called "rules of law" or 
conduct they consider. They are logical. Some of them are fine 
examples of judicial reasoning at its best. All that praise aside, they do 
not expressly articulate, analyze, and apply the policies that Leon 
Green argued were at the core of determining the scope of liability or 
duty in a torts case.2 96 Indeed, there may be a very good reason the 
courts often do not discuss Green's policies. 
As my friend and colleague, torts Professor Martha Chamallis 
commented to me at a conference at which both of us were about to 
present on the subject of this Article: The courts say their decisions are 
based on policy, but is policy really the basis of decision in a garden-
variety Duty/Risk case? It does not seem so. She is exactly right. When 
one considers whether the defendant ought to be liable to the particular 
plaintiff before the court for the particular risk, which arose in the 
particular manner in which it arose, the grand policies of torts are not 
at issue. What is at issue is a basic notion of fairness. Arguably, the most 
important thing is to achieve the right result in the case before the court 
on the facts before the court. Concerns that a particular result based on 
the unique facts of a particular case (as opposed to a decision involving 
broad categories of plaintiffs, defendants, and risks) are going to 
adversely impact the world seem unfounded and are never in my 
experience supported by empirical evidence. The question is, based on 
the unique facts and the credibility of the witnesses, should the 
defendant be liable for this risk? The decision turns on the particular 
facts, on the potential bizarreness of the events, and on the community's 
case-specific notion of justice. It is not about broad notions of the 
administration of justice or the judicial role or ethical or moral factors 
or deterrence or the capacity to bear the loss. It is about a pure sense of 
fairness. 
Moreover, the case-specific decision on scope of liability has no 
impact on the "law" of torts or the outcome of a future case. The results 
are idiosyncratic and applicable only to the case decided. For instance, 
in Hill, the no liability decision is limited to that case. No one would 
seriously argue that, afterHill, the "law" in Louisiana was that someone 
who left a ladder leaning up against the side of a house, after making 
hurricane repairs, was never liable, or never owed any duty, to someone 
who fell over the ladder when it was moved from the side of the house 
296. See GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, supra note 45, at 74-152. 
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to the ground by an unknown third-party.297 And no one would contend 
that any policies were at stake beyond a rough sense of justice arising 
out of the particular circumstances. 
After Gresham, no one would suggest that the "law" in Louisiana 
was that a minor who served alcohol to other minors was never not 
liable where one of the minors to whom alcohol was served grabbed 
the wheel of a car in which he was a passenger, causing a wreck 
resulting in serious injury.298 The decision was not law, and it was not 
broadly based on policy. It was a decision based on the bizarre turn of 
events and circumstances. 
In Roberts, the court in its initial hearing did state a legal rule-
Louisiana recognized the tort of negligent hiring-but then it held that 
the connection between the failure to exercise reasonable care in hiring 
and training and the resulting injuries before the court were too 
"attenuated" to impose liability.2 99 Recognizing the tort of negligent 
hiring was a legal decision, it was applicable to other cases. But, 
whether the duty not to negligently hire or train included the particular 
risk that occurred in the case was not law; it was fact-specific. Indeed, 
consistently with one of the messages of this piece, Justice Hall said, 
"There is no 'rule' for determining the scope of the duty."3 00 Then, on 
rehearing, the court narrowed its recognition of the tort of negligent 
hiring when Justice Cole said, "[W]e find that the duty implicated by 
this case is actually much narrower [than originally articulated;] the 
duty not to promote a cook to deputy in name alone, that is, not to 
engage in ersatz promotions."3 01 That was a much more case-specific 
statement of any duty owed. And while the court noted that the 
narrower duty's purpose was protecting the public fisc, rather than 
protecting against personal injury,302 its ultimate resolution had a most 
limited, if any, impact on future cases. 
The Cay decision, typical for Justice Lemmon, was clear, elegant 
in its direct style, and sensible. But the end result-that the duty to build 
guardrails of sufficient height to protect pedestrians included the risk 
that an intoxicated person, dressed in dark clothes at night, walking 
with traffic rather than against it, would become surprised or scared by 
297. See Hilly. Lundin& Assocs. Inc., 256 So. 2d 620 (La. 1972). 
298. See Greshamv. Davenport, 537 So. 2d 1144 (La. 1989). 
299. Robertsv. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1044-45 (La. 1991), on reh g, 605 So. 2d 1032 
(La. 1992). 
300. Id. at 1044. 
301. Id. at 1054. 
302. Id 
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a car coming up from behind him and fall to his death-was case-
specific.303 It was not law, and policy was not really involved. It was 
about fairness and the interplay of liability, victim fault, and the impact 
of comparative negligence. 
Finally, the decision in Chanthasalo was based on the particular 
facts and the time span between the initial accident and the second 
collision.304 It is not now Louisiana law that rear-ending someone, 
which causes the two involved cars to stop, does not result in liability 
to the rear-ending driver where a subsequent rear-end collision happens 
five to fifteen minutes later.305 It is, as the Romans said, sui generis. The 
decision was not policy-based. In fact, there would be nothing to 
prevent a lawyer in a subsequent case, with remarkably similar facts, 
from arguing that people driving by an accident often slow down and 
look-i.e., "rubber neck." Therefore, the lawyer in the future case 
might argue that the duty to avoid a rear-end collision does include the 
risk that someone will slow down to look at the results of that collision 
and that a driver following the rubbernecker will also rubberneck, but 
not slow down, will collide with the first rubbernecker, and will wreak 
further havoc for the victim of the first collision. 
None of the cases discussed above turned on policy at a level 
beyond pure case-specific fairness or "ease of association." And none 
of them resulted in "law" or a "rule" applicable to future cases. Recall 
Justice Hall's admonition that there is no rule for determining scope of 
duty.306 Wex Malone apparently would have agreed. In a wonderful 
article he wrote about Dixie Drive It Yourself 307 Wex Malone noted that 
after Dixie, lawyers had urged that the "rule" of Dixie was that courts 
must ignore the "intervening wrongdoing"30 8 of a third person in any 
case "against a defendant whose original negligence set the stage for 
the ensuing accident."30 9 in response, in the last sentence of the article, 
Malone tellingly refuted that contention and wrote, "[T]he Dixie 
decision represents exclusively an approach or a method of attack; 
303. See Cay v. State Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 93-0887 (La. 1/14/94); 631 So. 2d 393; 
see also Broadnax v. Foster, 47,079, p. 8 (La. App. 2d Cir. 4/11/12); 92 So. 3d 427, 433 ("The 
extent of protection owed by a defendant to a plaintiff is made on a case-by-case basis to avoid 
making a defendant an insurer of all persons against all harms."). 
304. See Chanthasalo v. Deshotel, 2017-0521, pp. 10-11 (La. App. 4th Cir. 12/27/17); 
234 So. 3d 1103, 1110. 
305. See id. 
306. Roberts, 605 So. 2d at 1044. 
307. Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 5. 
308. Id. at 392 (emphasis omitted). 
309. Id 
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there can be no such thing as a rule of the Dixie decision which might 
require that the case be distinguished in future litigation."310 
If there can be no such rule concerning the scope of the 
defendant's duty or liability, even in a violation of statute negligence 
case-because the decision is fact-specific-then why does the judge 
decide scope of duty? If the decision is dependent upon the facts of the 
particular case and policy is not involved at a broad class of plaintiffs, 
class of risks, or class of damages level, it makes more sense for juries 
or judges as fact finders to make the decision. Having judges make the 
scope of duty decision, even when it clearly, per Malone, does not result 
in a rule,3 1' runs the risk that lawyers will still treat the decision as a 
legal decision and rely on it in moving for summary judgment. And 
there is the risk that lower court trial and appellate judges,3 12 in deciding 
and reviewing cases on summary judgment, will treat prior decisions 
as if they were law and not case-specific decisions.313 
In his very scholarly opinion in Pitre v. Opelousas General 
Hospital,3 14 Justice Dennis noted the limits of the Duty/Risk method, 
where judges do not really analyze the relevant policies. Instead, he 
endorsed a "legal cause approach" where the nature and extent of 
damages was at issue. He wrote: 
The legal cause [synonymous with scope of duty or liability or protection 
in this paper] ofthe damage in question could be stated as part of the duty 
inquiry: was the defendant under a duty to protect each of the plaintiffs 
interests affected against the type of damage that did in fact occur? Such 
a formi of statement is sometimes helpful because it is less likely than 
"proximate cause" to be interpreted as if it were policy free fact finding; 
thus, "duty" is more apt to direct attention to the policy issues which 
310. Id. at 393. 
311. Id. 
312. Kenney v. Cox, 95-0126, p. 1 (La. 3/30/95); 652 So. 2d 992, 992 (Dennis, J., 
concurring). Therein, Justice Dennis noted the problem, stating: 
Consequently, the Court of Appeal treated as purely a legal question the issue of 
whether the harm caused decedent was within the scope of a duty owed her by the 
defendants. Because I feel that our jurisprudence has not clarified the distinction 
between the existence of a general duty of care (a legal question) and the "legal 
cause" or "duty/risk" question of the particular duty owed in a particular factual 
context (a mixed question of law and fact), and because this question is of special 
significance in the summary judgment context, I believe that it would be appropriate 
for us to grant the writ to consider this question more carefully. 
Id; cf Paul v. La. State Emps.' Group Benefit Program, 1999-0897, p. 9 (La. App. 1st Cir. 
5/12/00); 762 So. 2d 136, 143 (noting legal cause is a purely legal question). 
313. Or even, if illogically, as the basis for an exception of no cause of action. 
314. 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988). 
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determine the extent of the original obligation and its continuance, rather 
than to the mechanical sequence of events which goes to make up 
causation in fact. The duty risk approach is most helpful, however, in 
cases where the only issue is in reality whether the defendant stands in 
any relationship to the plaintiff as to create any legally recognized 
obligation of conduct for the plaintiff's benefit. Terms such as "duty" are 
merely verbal expressions of policy decisions and do not explain them. 
Allusions to policy should not be made a substitute for more determinate 
legal principles when they may be utilized.315 
There were and are other judicial indications that the scope of 
responsibility question was not a purely legal question but a mixed 
question of law and fact.316 
In Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Buildings,3 17 the court 
was not considering the scope of the defendant's duty, but rather the 
315. Id. at 1155-56 (citations omitted). He continued, in proposing a "legal cause" 
alternative: 
It is the task of the bench and the bar not only to ensure that justice is done, but also 
to demonstrate that it is being done according to law, which is essential to preserving 
public confidence. Policy considerations do indeed shape one's sense of the right 
decision, but whenever possible these should be given effect through the 
indispensable minimum of principles of liability in negligence, nebulous though 
they may be in themselves. Accordingly, we conclude that, when the case presents 
difficult issues as to the nature and extent of damages ascribed to the defendant, once 
it has been decided that the defendant's breach of a duty in fact caused damage to 
the plaintiff, it may be helpful to use a "legal cause" analysis which affords the 
application of "foreseeability" rules and other concepts of limitation. Although 
indistinct, these rules and concepts are more determinate than the abstract idea of a 
"duty" based on various "policy considerations" and may prove more helpful to 
triers of the facts, at least as starting points for legal reasoning. 
Id at 1156 (citation omitted). The rules he proposed for determining legal cause were a series 
of foreseeability rules based on whether the injury resulted from impact and the level of the 
defendant's fault. Id at 1161-62. 
316. See, e.g., Kenney, 95-0126, p. 1; 652 So. 2d at 992 (Dennis, J., concurring). Justice 
Dennis, concurring in a reversal of a summary judgment for defendant, wrote: 
Consequently, the Court of Appeal treated as purely a legal question the issue of 
whether the harm caused decedent was within the scope of a duty owed her by the 
defendants. Because I feel that our jurisprudence has not clarified the distinction 
between the existence of a general duty of care (a legal question) and the "legal 
cause" or "duty/risk" question of the particular duty owed in a particular factual 
context (a mixed question of law and fact), and because this question is of special 
significance in the summary judgment context, I believe that it would be appropriate 
for us to grant the writ to consider this question more carefully. 
Id; see also Parents of Minor Childv. Charlet, 2013-2879, p. 6 (La. 4/4/14); 135 So. 3d 1177, 
1181 ("Whether this particular priest owed this particular duty to the plaintiffs in this particular 
factual context is a mixed question of law and fact."). 
317. 2012-1238 (La. 4/5/13); 113 So. 3d 175. 
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conflation of duty and breach318 that had occurred or might occur in 
Louisiana "open and obvious" cases.3 19 There, the court held that 
determining breach-whether a thing posed an unreasonable risk of 
harm-involved a "myriad of factual considerations," "an abundance 
of factual findings," and "an application of those facts to a less-than 
scientific standard, [such that] a reviewing court is in no better position 
to make the determination than the jury or trial court."320 The same is 
true for scope of liability or duty. A decision on the scope of liability or 
duty involves the facts and factual findings. It involves fairness and 
justice at a case-specific level. It is the essence of a mixed question of 
law and fact. Scope of liability or duty is a matterfor thefactfinder not 
the lawgiver. And its legal or persuasive force is nil except as the 
decision of a particular case at a particular time and place by a particular 
fact finder. It is time for the Louisiana courts to recognize this basic 
truth and consistently articulate it and apply it. I return to this point in 
my final Part of recommendations. But in the next subpart I discuss the 
courts' inconsistent articulation of the various elements of the 
Duty/Risk analysis and the order in which a court should consider each 
of those elements.32 ' 
318. A related subject beyond the scope of this piece. 
319. Broussard, 2012-1238 atp. 1, 113 So. 3dat 178. 
320. Id. atpp. 12-13, 113 So. 3d at 185-86 (citing and quoting Reedv. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 97-1174, p. 4 (La. 3/4/98); 708 So. 2d 362, 364-65). 
321. Louisiana courts have also manifested two other tendencies that are not inevitable 
but that are unfortunate. These two tendencies also point in the direction of necessary change. 
First, some courts continue to mix together cause-in-fact and scope of duty or "proximate" 
cause. Second, courts still tend to emphasize the order in which events have occurred rather 
than the relation between the alleged tortious behavior and the risk and employ terms like 
"superseding cause" or "sole proximate cause." To reiterate, one of the primary targets of the 
legal realists-Green and Malone-was to force courts and lawyers to acknowledge and to 
separate the factual issue of cause from the scope of duty question. See text accompanying 
supra notes 59-60. The issue of factual cause is what we have come to call cause-in-fact. Courts 
usually decide cause-in-fact by asking whether it is more likely than not that "but for" the 
defendant's particular, alleged act of negligence, the plaintiff would not have suffered the 
particular injuries involved. Some cases use the substantial factor language but then essentially 
use the "but for" test. See, e.g., Breithaupt v. Sellers, 390 So. 2d 870, 873 (La. 1980); Perkins 
v. Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co., 147 So. 2d 646, 648-49 (La. 1962). Alternatively, the court 
will sometimes ask whether the defendant's negligence was a "substantial factor" in bringing 
about the plaintiff's injuries. Jeremiah Smith articulated the "substantial factor" test, and Green 
endorsed it. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 12, at 137, 140-41 (quoting 
Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 303 (1912)). Arguably, 
Malone's most renowned article is on cause-in-fact. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 
supra note 1. Happily, for the most part, courts ably keep the cause-in-fact analysis separate 
from the scope of duty or liability analysis but not always. In Vince v. Koontz, 16-52 1, p. 10 
(La. App. 5th Cir. 2/8/17); 213 So. 3d 448, 456, 
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C. Inconsistent Analytical Approaches, i.e., Duty Risk Deviations 
As noted in the previous subpart, courts frequently do not and, I 
contend, neither should nor can make a meaningful policy analysis in 
a garden-variety tort case at the fact- or case-specific level. The courts' 
failure to engage in that fact-specific policy analysis is not flawed; it is 
inevitable, and it counsels the need to entrust the case-specific scope of 
duty question to the fact finder as a mixed question of fact and law, 
rather than to the judge as a legal question. But, before continuing that 
discussion, another rather unfortunate judicial trend demands our 
attention. Louisiana courts are remarkably inconsistent in their 
articulation of the order of the key steps or elements in the Duty/Risk 
analysis and in articulating the proper method courts should use in 
analysis. 
the jury was informed "proximate cause" is "the primary act which produces the 
accident." After consideration of the foregoing, we find this definition describes 
the cause-in-fact element. Accordingly, when the jury found Mr. Koontz's 
negligence was not the "proximate cause" of the accident, it appears the jury actually 
determined that Mr. Koontz's negligence was not the cause-in-fact of the accident. 
The court concluded that the trial judge had not properly instructed on proximate cause. Id. But 
the court held that the error was essentially harmless because the jury in finding no proximate 
cause had actually found no cause-in-fact. Id. at p. 11-12, 213 So. 3d at 457. That decision was 
not manifestly erroneous because "a defendant's negligence may be severed by intervening 
and superseding causes." Id at p. 12, 213 So. 3d at 457. The reader will note that intervening 
and superseding causes were terms that courts used in determining proximate cause, not cause-
in-fact. Lahare v. Valentine Mech. Sers., LLC, 17-289, p. 6 (La. App. 5th Cir. 6/29/17); 223 
So. 3d 773, 778 (While it may be true that Ms. Lahare would not have been walking from 
door to door but for Valentine's actions, the alleged defect in the sidewalk was the intervening 
and superseding cause of her injuries. And these injuries, caused as they were by tripping over 
an alleged defect in the sidewalk, were certainly not a reasonably foreseeable risk of 
Valentine's failure to obtain the proper permit or failure to assist in the variance process. Ms. 
Lahare cannot prove cause-in-fact."). Thus, it bears emphasizing that cause-in-fact and scope 
of liability are two separate issues. Whoever decides scope of liability, it is a different issue 
than cause-in-fact. Cause-in-fact entails a fact-based decision and analysis comparing the 
defendant's alleged act of negligence and the injuries that the plaintiff suffered. Scope of duty 
or liability may depend upon the facts, but it is ultimately a decision about fairness, not about 
causation. 
Additionally, some Louisiana courts continue to use terms like intervening and/or 
superseding cause, see, e.g., Adams v. Rhodia, Inc., 2007-2110, p. 13 (La. 5/21/08); 983 So. 
2d 798, 808; Vince, 16-521, p. 12; 213 So. 3d at 457; Arcadian Corp. v. Olin Corp., 2001-1060, 
p. 7 (La. App. 3d Cir. 5/8/02); 824 So. 2d 396, 401; Domingue v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 
490 So. 2d 772, 775 (La. App. 3d Cir 1986), or "sole cause," see, e.g., Lewis v. Macke Bldg. 
Sers., Inc., 524 So. 2d 16, 18-19 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988); Wood v. Haas, 451 So. 2d 160, 
162 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984). And courts continue to emphasize the order of events. See 
Chanthasalo v. Deshotel, 2017-0521, pp. 9-11 (La. App. 4th Cir. 12/27/17); 234 So.3d 1103, 
1109-10. 
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The reader will recall that after Hill, the analytical order of the 
elements was cause-in-fact, duty/risk, breach, and damages.3 22 In the 
first years after Hill, at least some appellate courts considered the 
elements in the so-called Hill order.323 But it was not long before courts 
began reordering the elements of negligence under the Duty/Risk 
analytical approach to negligence. For instance, in Frank v. Pitre, the 
Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit, while citing Hill, 
articulated the elements in the following order: duty, breach, cause-in-
fact, and scope of protection.324 It was not long before the Louisiana 
Supreme Court followed suit and deviated from the Hill analytical 
order of negligence elements. 
For instance, in the Louisiana Supreme Court's original opinion 
in Roberts v. Benoit, echoing Frank, Justice Hall listed the elements of 
negligence as follows: cause-in-fact, duty, breach, and scope of 
protection. 325 Then, on rehearing, Justice Cole listed the elements as 
follows: duty, breach, cause-in-fact, legal cause, and damages.326 In 
addition to switching the analytical order in which decision makers 
address the elements of negligence, Justice Cole used the phrase legal 
cause instead of scope of protection. 
Subsequently, in Cay v. State DOTD, the court said negligence 
consisted of cause-in-fact, duty, breach, and scope of duty.327 In Joseph 
v. Dickerson, the court repeated that order of analysis but used the 
words legal cause, instead of scope of protection, and added 
322. Hill v. Lundin Assocs., Inc., 256 So. 2d 620, 622-23 (La. 1972). 
323. See, e.g, Carter v. City Par. Gov't of E. Baton Rouge, 423 So. 2d 1080, 1084-88 
(La. 1982); Lee v. Vidrine, 316 So. 2d 402, 403-04 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Stewart v. Gibson 
Prods. of Natchitoches Par. La., Inc., 300 So. 2d 870, 876-77 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974); Mixon 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 300 So. 2d 232, 235-39 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974). Once again, I am not 
trying to be encyclopedic here, merely to show some trends. Hill has been cited by courts 454 
times. 
324. 341 So. 2d 1376, 1379 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977) (citing Hill, 256 So. 2d at 621-23). 
325. 605 So. 2d 1032, 1041 (La. 1991), on reh'g, 605 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1992) (dealing 
with negligent hiring, training, and supervising and vicarious liability); see also Lazard v. Foti, 
2002-2888, p. 3 (La. 10/21/03); 859 So. 2d 656, 659 (listing them as cause-in-fact, duty, breach, 
and scope of protection); Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 99-1222, p. 4 (La. 11/30/99); 752 
So. 2d 762, 765 (listing them as cause-in-fact, duty, breach, and scope of protection). 
326. Roberts, 605 So. 2dat 1051. 
327. 93-0887 (La. 1/14/94); 631 So. 2d 393, 395-99; see also Broadnax v. Foster, 
47,079, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 2d Cir. 4/11/12); 92 So. 3d 427, 432 (listing them as cause-in-fact, 
duty, breach, and scope of protection); Williams ex rel. Williams v. Jones, 2009-839, p. 5 (La. 
App. 5th Cir. 2/23/10); 34 So. 3d 926, 929-30 (same). 
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damages.328 The variety of ordering approaches has continued.329 For 
instance, in Chanthasalo v. Deshotel, the court stated that the elements 
of negligence were duty, breach, cause-in-fact, legal cause, and 
damages,330 echoing Justice Cole's order of elements from Roberts.3 3 ' 
Of course, one may shrug one's shoulders and say, what or why 
does it matter? And perhaps it really doesn't matter if the same basic 
elements are at issue whatever order one employs to consider them. But 
I think it does matter. For one thing, it causes confusion.33 2 Just what 
are the elements of negligence, and how does a lawyer or a lower court 
judge present them? The confusion leads to inconsistency in approach. 
Emerson was no doubt right when he said, "A foolish consistency is 
the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and 
philosophers and divines."3 33 The key word of course is "foolish." 
There is value in consistency. It allows people to plan and to rely upon 
stable rules and expectations. One may counter that if the substantive 
elements (rules) are the same, the order in which a court analyzes them 
328. 99-1046, 99-1188, p. 6 (La. 1/19/00); 754 So. 2d 912, 916. 
329. Wiltzv. Bros. Petroleum, L.L.C., 2013-332, 2013-334, 2013-333, p. 9 (La. App. 
5th Cir. 4/23/14); 140 So. 3d 758, 766-67 (listing duty, breach, cause-in-fact, legal cause or 
scope of liability or protection, and actual damages); J.M. ex rel. A.C. v. Acadia Par. Sch. Bd., 
2008-1377, p. 4 (La. App. 3d Cir. 4/1/09); 7 So. 3d 150, 153 (listing duty, breach, cause-in-
fact, scope of liability or protection, and damages); cf Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 2008-
1163, 2008-1169, pp. 26-27 (La. 5/22/09); 16 So. 3d 1065, 1086 (listing cause-in-fact, duty, 
breach, scope of protection); Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 94-0952, pp. 4-5 (La. 11/30/94); 
646 So. 2d 318, 321-22 (listing cause-in-fact, duty, breach, and scope of protection); England 
v. Fifth La. Levee Dist., 49,795, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 2d Cir. 6/3/15); 167 So. 3d 1105, 1109-10 
(same); Covington v. Howard, 49,135, p. 5 (La. App. 2d Cir. 8/13/14); 146 So. 3d 933, 937 
(listing duty, breach, cause-in-fact, legal cause, and damages); Kulka v. Shag II, 2012-398, p. 
5 (La. App. 3d Cir. 10/24/12); 100 So. 3d 412, 415 (same); Frederick v. Vermillion Par. Sch. 
Bd., 2000-382, p. 3-4 (La. App. 3d Cir. 10/18/00); 772 So. 2d 208, 212 (listing duty, breach, 
cause-in-fact, and scope of protection), writ denied, 781 So. 2d 561 (La. 2001). Compare, using 
the classic Hill order, Thomas v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, 38,170, p. 10 (La. 
App. 2d Cir. 3/19/04); 870 So. 2d 390, 397 (listing cause-in-fact, duty, breach, scope of 
protection). 
330. 2017-0521, p. 6 (La. App. 4th Cir. 12/27/17); 234 So. 3d 1103, 1107-08; see also 
Chatmanv. S. Univ. at New Orleans, 2015-1179, pp. 10-11 (La. App. 4th Cir. 7/16/16); 197 
So. 3d 366, 374 (listing duty, breach, cause-in-fact, legal cause, and damages). 
331. See Roberts,605 So. 2dat 1051. 
332. Last year when we were discussing the changing order of negligence in my torts 
class, a student, Corinne Gamble, raised her hand and asked, in reference to the shifting order 
of elements, "Can they do that?" I nodded slowly and said, "Yes, they, especially the Louisiana 
Supreme Court, can do what they want." 
333. Quote by Ralph Waldo Emerson, GOODREADS, https://www.goodreads.com/ 
quotes/353571-a-foolish-consistency-is-the-hobgoblin-of-little-minds-adored (last visited Feb. 27, 
2020). 
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will not impact the primary activity33 4 of those subject to the rules. But 
the order of analysis will impact the activity and strategy of lawyers 
who are working to protect the rights of those engaged in planning their 
primary activity in commerce, medicine, manufacturing, hiring, and 
even driving. I would contend that lawyers are important actors on 
today's American stage of economic activity and to the extent lawyers 
are confused by inconsistent analysis and application of law, the 
confusion will have a potential impact on those subject to that law. In 
the case of tort law, that is all of us. 
Let me pause for a moment and make some observations on the 
Hill order of analysis. Reiterating, the court began with cause-in-fact as 
the first element in the analysis.335 Perhaps it made sense to analyze 
cause-in-fact first because, if there is no factual cause, then the 
appropriate decision maker need not undertake the stickier, more 
fairness-based analyses of Duty/Risk and breach. That is fine for a trial 
to the bench, but what about ajury trial? Confusion abounds when the 
second element per Hillis Duty/Risk.33 6 Does the defendant owe a duty 
to this plaintiff to protect against the relevant risk? If this is indeed a 
question of law, then the judge decides it as lawgiver and not as fact 
finder. This is where, per Green and Malone, the court supposedly 
conducts a legal/social policy analysis.3 37 Even if the particular scope 
of risk question is for the fact finder, the broader duty issue is for the 
court, and if duty (or Duty/Risk) is the second (or second and third 
elements and, as noted above, many courts have split the Duty/Risk 
question into two questions), the court still makes a legal decision after 
the fact finder has made a factual or mixed fact and law decision (on 
cause-in-fact). That is all well and good; however, if the purpose of 
having the court analyze cause-in-fact first was to avoid the necessity 
of a policy-based duty or Duty/Risk decision, the logic of the order is 
suspect. It is suspect because whenever the fact finder decides that the 
defendant was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries and the court 
decides that there is no duty (or the risk was not within the scope of any 
duty as a matter of law), the fact finder will have made a meaningless 
334. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 381-82, 403-04 (1970); 
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 450 (tent. ed. 1958). 
335. Hill y. Lundin Assocs., Inc., 256 So. 2d 620, 622 (La. 1972). 
336. Id. 
337. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 12, at 76-77; Malone, 
Cause-in-Fact, supra note 1, at 72; Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 5. 
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cause-in-fact determination, which is certainly not efficient. And in a 
jury trial, the court will have empaneled a jury to make that decision. 
The illogic does not stop there. If the fact finder decides that the 
defendant was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries and the court 
decides that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty and that the risk 
was within the scope of the duty, then and only then, per the Hill 
elemental schemata, does the fact finder decide whether there has been 
a breach of the relevant duty.338 It is a veritable tennis match of 
negligence elements between the judge and the fact finder. The fact 
finder decides cause-in-fact. The lawgiver decides duty and/or 
Duty/Risk. The fact finder decides breach. 
It is even worse for those courts that separate the duty and risk 
elements.33 9 Those courts that separate the two have an additional 
volley. For instance, in Cay, the court considered the elements of 
negligence in the following order: cause-in-fact, duty, breach, scope of 
protection, and damages.340 Thus, the allocation of decision-making in 
the order would be: 
Element Who Decides 
Cause-in-Fact Fact Finder 
Duty Judge 
Breach Fact Finder 
Scope of Liability Judge34 1 
Damages Fact Finder3 42 
One may safely assume that the hypothetical back-and-forth volleying 
of decision-making between judge and fact finder would not require 
multiple coffee breaks between elements (sets!) in a jury trial. 
Presumably, the judge would decide those issues the judge should 
decide, and the fact finder would decide those issues the fact finder 
should decide. In a case tried to the court, the judge would be careful 
to separate his or her functions. In either case, would it make sense to 
group the elements together in order with the appropriate decision 
makers? Otherwise, there is one potential "order" of decision at trial 
338. Hill, 256 So. 2dat623. 
339. See cases cited supra note 329. 
340. Cay v. State ex. rel Dep't & Transp. & Dev., 93-0087 (La. 1/14/94); 631 So. 2d 
393, 395-99. 
341. Of course, the argument herein is that the jury or judge as fact finder should decide 
scope of liability. 
342. And the fact finder would thereafter consider whether the plaintiff was also 
negligent (as in Cay) and allocate fault. Id. at 399. 
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and another on appeal. That has the potential to confuse lawyers, 
judges, law students, and people writing about the law.3 43 Moreover, 
having different trial orders of deciding and appellate orders of 
deciding is inconsistent with transparency unless it is clearly explained. 
My sense is that any explanation of the inconsistency could never be 
quite clear to someone untrained in the law; nor would it be wholly 
convincing to someone trained in the law. 
The court ought to decide "law" issues first. First, if there is no 
duty, there is no reason to empanel a jury, no reason to call witnesses, 
etc. The case is over before the justice system spends precious societal 
resources on deciding factual questions or mixed questions of fact and 
law. Second, having the court decide legal issues first is consistent with 
trial process and practice. That is, typically, the plaintiff sues. The 
defendant at that stage, even before answering, can move for dismissal. 
In Louisiana, the appropriate procedural devices are the exception of 
no cause of action or the exception of no right of action.3 44 The 
defendant claims that, based on the pleadings, the plaintiff has not 
alleged any viable cause of action against it. In a negligence case, the 
defendant says, I owe no duty to the plaintiff. Or the defendant says, 
While I may owe a duty to someone, I do not owe a duty to this person. 
These are legal questions that the court can decide at the outset. If the 
court denies the exception(s), then the machination of developing and 
discovering facts can begin.345 Of course if reasonable minds could not 
disagree on cause-in-fact, breach, or scope of liability/risk, a court 
might grant a summary judgment for one side or the other before 
trial.3 46 
Finally, beyond the order of decision, as I have pointed out, courts 
are not consistent in their analytical approaches to deciding negligence. 
Some refer to scope of liability or scope of the risk. Others use the 
phrase legal cause. And courts, even the same court on the same case, 
mix approaches. For instance, in Lazardv. Foti, the parents of a sixteen-
year-old who was detained by law enforcement as an adult, released, 
343. I.e., law professors. 
344. LA. CODE CIv. PROC. arts. 923, 927(A)(5)-(6) (2020). 
345. Thereafter if the court denies the exceptions, the defendant would answer, the 
parties would conduct discovery, and then the defendant might move for summary judgment. 
Of course, the defendant might move for summary judgment on any issue, contending that 
there are no material issues of fact. In a negligence action, where the defendant moves for 
summary judgment because there are no material issues of fact, the court must be careful to 
gauge exactly what it is deciding: a legal matter or a factual matter or a matter involving a 
mixed question of fact and law. 
346. Id. art 966. 
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and killed twelve hours later, sued the sheriff who had detained the 
minor.3 47 The majority held that the sheriff was not liable,348 but there 
were three opinions revealing three very different approaches to the 
duty, scope of duty, Duty/Risk, and legal cause conundra. Justice 
Traylor's majority opinion was straight Duty/Risk and analyzed the 
scope of duty imposed by a statute, its underlying policy and purpose, 
and its reach.349 Justice Weimer's concurrence suggested 
considerations of time, place, and bizarreness.350 Finally, Justice 
Johnson in her dissent called for a trial of the underlying claim because 
of critical factual issues that bore on the scope and reach of any duty 
owed.351 
VI. RECAP AND REENERGIZING 
Before proceeding, a short recap is advisable. The law's 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century approach to deciding 
proximate cause was a fake. Judges hid a fairness decision behind 
vague "magic" words like cause, foreseeable, unforeseeable, direct, 
remote, natural and probably, intervening causes, superseding causes, 
and more.352 The great torts scholars of the twentieth century, including 
Green and Malone, building on the work of some who came before 
them, saw, in the spirit of Legal Realism, that something else was going 
347. 2002-2888, p. 1 (La. 10/21/03); 859 So. 2d 656, 658; see also Brooks v. State ex 
rel. Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 2010-1908, pp. 3-10 (La. 7/1/11); 74 So. 3d 187, 189-93 
(containing different approaches to negligence in the opinions). There the decedent, while at 
work as operating engineer, was driving a backhoe along the shoulder of a state highway in an 
industrial area to deliver to another company (and thereby avoid expense of loading the 
backhoe onto a truck). Brooks, 2010-1908, at p. 1, 74 So. 3d at 188. The backhoe flipped while 
making a turn from the highway shoulder onto a driveway and crushed the man to death. Id at 
pp. 1-2, 74 So. 3d at 188-89. The man's family filed a wrongful death suit against the DOTD. 
Id at p. 2, 74 So. 3d at 189. There was a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, and it was 
affirmed by the appellate court but amended to attribute 20% of fault to the driver. Id In 
denying recovery, the majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the condition of the 
shoulder did not present an unreasonable risk of harm and that the DOTD's duty did not 
encompass the risk that occurred. Id at pp. 8-10, 74 So. 3d at 192-93. Justice Knoll concurred 
but found that the DOTD did not owe the decedent any duty. Id at p. 1, 74 So. 3d at 195 (Knoll, 
J., concurring). Justice Johnson dissented, finding that the DOTD owed the decedent a duty, 
which it breached. Id at pp. 1-3, 74 So. 3d at 194-95 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
348. Lazard, 2002-2888, p. 8, 859 So. 2d at 662. 
349. See id. at pp. 5-8, 859 So. 2d at 660-62. 
350. See id at p. 1, 859 So. 2d at 666 (Weimer, J., concurring) (quoting Roberts v. 
Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1058 (La. 1991)). 
351. See id. at pp. 6-7, 859 So. 2d at 665 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
352. See, e.g, Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 5, at 363-64. 
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on. They knew that judges using magic words were like the wizard 
working in Oz. 
Green and Malone ripped back the curtain, and they claimed that 
the issue courts called proximate cause was really an issue of policy, 
involving various policies at stake in the administration ofjustice.353 As 
noted, Green articulated those policies as the following: the 
administrative factor, the ethical or moral factor, the economic factor, 
the prophylactic or preventive factor, and the justice factor, including 
the capacity to bear the loss. 35 4 But, as the discussion in Part V above 
showed, Louisiana courts in most garden-variety torts cases have not, 
in fact, analyzed policy but have instead made case-specific, fairness-
based decisions dependent on the facts of the particular case before the 
court. I have contended herein that these fact-specific fairness decisions 
are not "policy"-based decisions for a court but are more appropriately 
mixed questions of fact and law. And, as such, the scope of liability/risk 
question is really a question for the fact finder and resolution of the 
scope of liability/risk issue is dependent on the specific facts at issue. 
It is not a legal decision. If it is "law" at all, it is only "law" for the 
parties to the particular case; it is not "law" for anyone else. Treating 
scope of liability/risk in a garden-variety tort case as a legal decision 
would also impact the standard of review that an appellate court 
employs: de novo on issues of law or manifest error on issues of fact or 
mixed questions of fact and law. If the scope of liability determination 
is a legal determination, then the court would review it de novo, but if 
it is a mixed question of law and fact law, the court's review would be 
under the manifest error standard.3 55 Since the scope of liability/risk 
decision should be for the fact finder, the appropriate standard of 
review should be manifest error. 
In so contending, I am echoing what my friend Dave Robertson 
said over twenty years ago when he proposed his "Keetonian" model 
for allocating decision-making in Louisiana tort cases.356 He said that 
fact finders should decide scope of liability.35 7 I am also influenced by 
my friend Professor Chamallis' observation, noted above, that policy 
really is not at stake in most garden-variety negligence cases. That is, 
353. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, supra note 12, at 76-77; Malone, 
Cause-in-Fact, supra note 1, at 72; Malone, Dixie Drive It, supra note 5. 
354. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, supra note 45, at 74-152. 
355. See, e.g., Adams v. Rhodia, 2007-2110, p. 10 (La. 5/21/08); 983 So. 2d 798, 806 
(reviewing a determination of scope of risk under the manifest error standard). 
356. Robertson, Allocating Authority, supra note 19, at 1092-96. 
3 57. Id. 
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at the fact-specific level, most tort cases really are not vehicles for 
shaping future conduct and influencing law and society. Most cases 
involve basic fairness between the parties, based on the particular facts. 
There are policy-dominant cases where the law can shape the future. 
These are what I think of as true duty cases-cases like those discussed 
in the next Part. In those cases, the issues are analyzed at the categorical 
level, and the courts truly do (and should) consider the policy 
implications of their decisions. But most tort cases are not like that; 
they are not categorical, but fact-specific. There, policy is not involved; 
the case will not shape the future. But the decision will hopefully 
provide case-specific justice for the parties. 
Returning to Robertson, Justice Lemmon, in a concurring opinion 
in Pitre v. Louisiana Tech University, quoted Robertson and his 
coauthors as follows: 
The statement that "the defendant had no duty," as noted in Professor 
David W. Robertson et al, Cases and Materials on Torts 161 (1989), 
should be reserved for those "situations controlled by a rule of law of 
enough breadth and clarity to permit the trial judge in most cases raising 
the problem to dismiss the complaint or award summary judgment for 
defendant on the basis of the rule." Thus, a "no duty" defense generally 
applies when there is a categorical rule excluding liability as to whole 
categories of claimants or of claims under any circumstances. In the 
usual case where the duty owed depends upon the circumstances of the 
particular case, analysis of the defendant's conduct should be done in 
terms of "no liability" or "no breach of duty."358 
So, where in the negligence formula, if anywhere, does the 
Green/Malone policy analysis take place? Like Robertson said: at the 
duty determination. And, like Robertson and his coauthors noted, the 
court should engage in the duty/no duty analysis at the categorical 
level, not at the case-specific level. There are, in fact, Louisiana 
Supreme Court cases that wonderfully demonstrate the appropriate 
categorical level of analysis. I turn next to two of those decisions. 
VII. DUTY AS POLICY 
In Reynolds v. Bordelon, the issue before the court was whether 
Louisiana would recognize a claim for negligent spoliation.35 9 The 
358. 95-1466, 95-1487, p. 22 (La. 5/10/96); 673 So. 2d 585, 596 (Leninon, J., 
concurring) (quoting DAvID W. ROBERTSON, WILLIAM POWERS, JR. & DAVID A. ANDERSON, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 161 (1989)). 
359. 2014-2362, p. 1 (La. 6/30/15); 172 So. 3d 589, 592. 
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court decided that it would not, in part because there were multiple 
other avenues available to protect litigants where evidence was, or 
might be, destroyed or damaged.36 0 Justice Clark clearly and, in my 
schematic for decision, properly articulated the issue as a duty issue.3 61 
In discussing that duty issue, he analyzed and wrote categorically. The 
decision and opinion did not depend upon the specific facts of the case, 
but rather on the categorical issue of whether Louisiana should 
recognize a duty to preserve evidence from negligent destruction. The 
court carefully discussed the relevant policies and considered each in 
the context of whether Louisiana should impose a duty not to 
negligently destroy evidence.362 Justice Clark analyzed the broad issue 
in terms of "deterrence of undesirable conduct, avoiding the deterrence 
of desirable conduct, compensation of victims, satisfaction of the 
community's sense ofjustice, proper allocation of resources (including 
judicial resources), predictability, and deference to the legislative 
will."3 63 The reader will recognize these policies as a modernized 
statement of the Green policies.3 6 4 In deciding not to recognize a duty, 
the court articulated "a categorical rule excluding liability as to [a] 
whole categor[y] of claimants or of claims under any 
circumstances."3 65 And it did so after considering each of the policy 
factors articulated above.366 
360. Id at pp. 13-14, 172 So. 3d at 600. The court said: 
Discovery sanctions and criminal sanctions are available for first-party spoliators. 
Additionally, Louisiana recognizes the adverse presumption against litigants who 
had access to evidence and did not make it available or destroyed it. Regarding 
negligent spoliation by third parties, the plaintiff who anticipates litigation can enter 
into a contract to preserve the evidence and, in the event of a breach, avail himself 
of those contractual remedies. Court orders for preservation are also obtainable. In 
this particular case, the plaintiff also could have retained control of his vehicle and 
not released it to the insurer, thereby guaranteeing its availability for inspection. 
Furthermore, he could have bought the vehicle back from the insurer for a nominal 
fee. Thus, we find the existence of alternate avenues for recovery further support our 
holding. 
Id 
361. See id. at pp. 1, 8, 172 So. 3d at 592, 596-97. 
362. See id. at pp. 8-13, 172 So. 3d at 596-600. 
363. Id atp. 8, 172 So. 3d at 596 (quoting FRANKL. MARAIST& THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, 
JR., LOUISIANA TORT LAW § 5.02 (2d ed. 2004)). 
364. See GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, supra note 45, at 74-152. 
365. Pitr v. La. Tech Univ., 95-1466, 95-1487, p. 1 (La. 5/10/96); 673 So. 2d 585, 596 
(Lemmon, J., concurring). 
366. It is not important for present purposes whether one agrees with the court's 
decision. Its method, for my purposes, is unassailable. 
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367 the Years before, in Pitre v. Opelousas GeneralMedical Center,
Louisiana Supreme Court considered how Louisiana tort law would 
approach wrongful pregnancy,368 wrongful birth,369 and wrongful life 
claims.370 The court, in a scholarly opinion by then-Justice Dennis, 
considered precedent in other states on the relevant issues-an 
appropriate factor.37 ' As to the child's claim, Justice Dennis aptly 
applied the policies of tort law at the categorical level. He wrote: 
The persons at whose disposal society has placed the potent implements 
of technology owe a heavy moral obligation to use them carefully and to 
avoid foreseeable harm to present or future generations. In the field of 
medicine, as in that of manufacturing, the need for compensation of 
innocent victims of defective products and negligently delivered services 
is a powerful factor influencing tort law. Typically in these areas also the 
defendants' capacity to bear and distribute the losses is far superior to 
that of consumers. Additionally these defendants are in a much better 
position than the victims to analyze the risks involved in the defendants' 
activities and to either take precautions to avoid them or to insure against 
them. Consequently, a much stronger and more effective incentive to 
prevent the occurrence of future harm will be created by placing the 
burden of foreseeable losses on the defendants than upon the 
disorganized, uninformed victims.37 2 
One will recognize that the policies he articulated and considered were 
morality, compensation, capacity to bear the loss, who is in the best 
position to analyze and prevent the loss, 3 73 and deterrence. As can be 
seen, the court analyzed each of the applicable policies at the 
categorical level, not at the case-specific level. In this regard, the 
367. 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988). 
368. The claim of the parents that they became pregnant, usually as a result of the fault 
of a health care provider, when they did not intend to do so. Id at 1153-54. 
369. The claim of the parents that they became pregnant, usually as a result of the fault 
of a health care provider, with a child who suffered from some condition that made it more 
burdensome to raise the child than one might otherwise anticipate. Id 
370. The claim of a child born, usually as a result of the fault of a health care provider, 
with a condition that made life more challenging than one would otherwise anticipate. Id 
371. See id. at 1154-55, 1157-58. 
372. Id at 1157. Interestingly, Justice Dennis later lists these same policy factors as he 
begins to discuss legal cause. Id at 1161. Perhaps this is due to the inevitable overlap between 
factors relevant to decision of the various elements of negligence. But I would contend that it 
is not for the fact finder, when deciding scope of liability, to attempt to undertake any 
articulated logical analysis of the articulated policies other than as part of its decision on basic 
fairness or common sense. 
373. See id at 1157. This policy is a variation on Judge Calabresi's "cheapest or easier 
cost avoider." See GuIDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 135 n.1 (1970). 
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analysis is similar to the analysis in Reynolds.37 4 Both opinions reflect 
a broad, policy-based analysis and articulate duty rules or no duty rules 
based on that policy analysis.3 75 
But what about at the more case-specific level, and who should 
decide what? I have already argued that the scope of duty or liability is 
generally not a policy question; it is a matter of common sense, justice, 
and fairness. And it is a decision for the fact finder, not the lawgiver. 
By recognizing that reality and properly allocating decision-making 
responsibility, Louisiana courts will clarify the law, ensure consistency, 
and avoid over particularized, picayune, fact-specific decisions 
masquerading as legal decisions. They will also join the mainstream of 
American tort law, as articulated in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm. 
VIII. FOLLOWING THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD): A BRIGHTER, 
CLEARER, BETTER FUTURE 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm abandons the terms proximate and legal cause.37 6 This 
makes sense because of the intellectual damage these terms have done 
and the confusion they have caused. In addition, when addressing duty, 
the redactors imposed a general duty to exercise reasonable care.377 
That is, one person generally owes another person a duty to exercise 
374. Notably there are other Louisiana Supreme Court decisions where the court 
undertakes a level at the broad policy level but then decides that, rather than articulate a duty 
or no duty rule at the categorical level to leave future decisions to the Duty/Risk approach to 
negligence. See, e.g, Barrie v. V.P. Exterminators, Inc., 625 So. 2d 1007, 1011-18 (La. 1993) 
(discussing thoroughly the various national approaches to deciding to whom a duty is owed in 
a negligent misrepresentation case and then, rather than adopting any of those approaches, 
deciding the case under Louisiana's Duty/Risk approach to negligence); PPG Indus. Inc. v. 
Bean Dredging, 447 So. 2d 1058, 1060-62 (La. 1984) (rejecting a categorical no duty rule in 
negligent infliction of economic harm cases and relying on the Duty/Risk analysis instead). 
375. See also LeJeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990) (discussing 
broad policy for duty). There the court recognized a claim for bystander emotional distress in 
a negligence action after an extensive analysis of what other jurisdictions' courts had decided 
and their reasoning. Id. at 564-70. The court also recognized the desire, when articulating a 
new cause of action, to move cautiously and give the lower courts direction, which the court 
did. See id. at 570-71. Justice Lemmon's opinion is a masterpiece of traditional legal reasoning 
and writing. The legislature later essentially codified the decision with some variation. See LA. 
CIv. CODE art. 2315.6 (2020). 
376. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
special note on proximate cause (AM. LAw INST. 2005). 
377. Id § 7: see also id § 6 ( An actor wh1ose negligence is a factuIl cause of phI sical 
lhaIn is subject to liabiliy for any stucl lharn within the scope of liabilit. unless the court 
determines that the ordinary duli of reasonable care is inapplicable.). 
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reasonable care-a duty to be careful. The general duty to exercise 
reasonable care is sensible. "Such is the language of the street." 3 78 It is 
consistent with how nonlawyers, i.e., jurors, think. 
The Restatement (Third) also provides that the general duty to 
exercise reasonable care may not apply in exceptional cases. What 
would justify an exception? When is there "an articulated countervailing 
principle or policy [that] warrants denying or limiting liability"?3 79 That 
is, in deciding whether there is a reason to find no duty or to limit the 
general duty of reasonable care, the court should consider policy at a 
broad, categorical level. 38 0 This is precisely what the Louisiana 
Supreme Court did in Reynolds in deciding that Louisiana would not 
impose a duty not to negligently destroy evidence.3 8 1 
But what does the Restatement (Third) say about scope of 
liability? "An important difference between them is that no-duty rules 
are matters of law decided by the courts, while the defendant's scope 
of liability is a question of fact for the factfinder." 382 Recognizing that 
scope of liability is a question for the fact finder, as Professor Robertson 
argued, is appropriate because, as noted above, it depends upon the 
facts of the particular case.383 It is not law. It is for the fact finder, which, 
as noted below, the Restatement (Third) recognizes. 
As noted, the Restatement (Third) test for determining scope of 
liability is remarkably similar to the Louisiana Duty/Risk approach. 
Indeed, the redactors call their approach the "risk standard." 384 What is 
the Restatement (Third) "risk standard"? "An actor's liability is limited 
to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor's conduct 
tortious."" In this regard, then, the drafters borrowed from the Legal 
378. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 102 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., 
dissenting). 
379. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 7(b). 
380. Id. § 7 cmt. i ("A no-duty ruling represents a determination, a purely legal question, 
that no liability should be imposed on actors in a category of cases. Such a ruling should be 
explained and justified based on articulated policies or principles that justify exempting these 
actors from liability or modifying the ordinary duty of reasonable care. These reasons of policy 
and principle do not depend on the foreseeability of harm based on the specific facts of a case. 
They should be articulated directly without obscuring references to foreseeability."). 
381. See Reynolds v. Bordelon, 2014-2362 (La. 6/30/15); 172 So. 3d 589. 
382. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 7 cmt. a. 
383. Robertson, Allocating Authority, supra note 19, at 1092-96. 
384. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABLITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 29 cmt. d. 
385. Id. § 29. 
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Realist approach and the Louisiana approach. But, as the Restatement 
(Third) makes clear, it is for the jury (fact finder) to decide scope of 
liability.38 6 Comment d provides, in part: 
Thus, the jury should be told that, in deciding whether the plaintiff's 
harm is within the scope of liability, it should go back to the reasons for 
finding the defendant engaged in negligent or other tortious conduct. If 
the harms risked by that tortious conduct include the general sort of harm 
suffered by the plaintiff, the defendant is subject to liability for the 
plaintiff's harm. When defendants move for a determination that the 
plaintiff's harm is beyond the scope of liability as a matter of law, courts 
must initially consider all of the range of harms risked by the defendant's 
conduct that the jury could find as the basis for determining that conduct 
tortious. Then, the court can compare the plaintiff's harm with the range 
of harms risked by the defendant to determine whether a reasonable jury 
might find the former among the latter.387 
Clearly, then, the Restatement (Third) allocates the scope of liability 
determination to the jury. The third sentence, which begins to deal with 
a defendant moving for judgment as a matter of law, does not 
contemplate the court making a legal decision; rather it contemplates a 
court deciding whether reasonable minds could not disagree on the 
scope of liability issue. Put in Louisiana parlance, the Restatement 
(Third) asks whether a juror (or judge as fact finder) could easily 
associate the risk that arose in the particular case with what the 
defendant did, which the juror considered to be a breach of the standard 
of care. As the redactors note, the risk standard offers "relative 
simplicity." 388 
In recognition of that simplicity as well as the wisdom of 
allocating the scope of liability issue to the fact finder, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court should adopt and consistently apply the Restatement 
(Third) approach to negligence. In that regard, we should borrow from 
the Restatement (Third) as it borrowed its risk approach from us. In 
adopting the Restatement (Third) approach to duty, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court should clearly state that generally a person owes a duty 
to exercise reasonable care to others. The general duty to exercise 
reasonable care is consistent with Louisiana Civil Code article 
2315(A), which provides: "Every act whatever of man that causes 
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair 
386. See id. 
387. Id. § 29 cmt. d (first emphasis added). 
388. Id § 29 cmt. e. 
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it."389 The Code article is broad and comprehensive in its sweep. A 
general duty to exercise reasonable care is consistent with that breadth 
and sweep. Moreover, it is consistent with Louisiana Civil Code article 
2316, which provides, "Every person is responsible for the damage he 
occasions not merely by his act, but by his negligence, his imprudence, 
or his want of skill."3 90 As in article 2315, the language of article 2316 
is broad. It imposes liability for negligence-a type of fault-
unfettered by detailed conditions and limitations. 
Of course, despite the breadth, Louisiana jurisprudence has long 
recognized that the law does not impose unlimited liability, and in 
broad categories of cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court may, after an 
articulated analysis of the relevant Code articles, policies, and 
jurisprudence (both in Louisiana and elsewhere), conclude that the 
general duty to exercise reasonable care either should not apply or 
should be cabined by other broadly applicable rules. Reynolds provides 
a fine example of such a decision.39 1 
But where a negligence case does not involve a decision at the 
categorical level and the fact-specific scope of liability is at issue, the 
fact finder should make that decision, not the judge as lawgiver. That 
is because the scope of liability decision at the case-specific level is 
exactly that: specific. It depends more upon the facts, fairness, and 
common sense than it does upon any policy. It depends upon a sense of 
particularized fairness and the common sense of the community, not 
social policy, economics, or academic philosophies. I would add that 
when a court makes a fairness decision under the guise of deciding a 
legal question, it usurps power from the fact finder.392 I also would 
argue that in making case-specific fairness decisions, it is difficult to 
explain them, and it is precisely the place where one's predetermined 
views of the world or of fairness arguably have great influence. Another 
way to say that is to say that, in making a gut-level fairness decision, 
one's inherent bias may rear its head. Consequently, I would prefer to 
have groups of people-juries-making those decisions after 
389. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315(A) (2020). 
390. Id. art. 2316. 
391. See Reynolds v. Benoit, 2014-2362 (La. 6/30/15); 172 So. 2d 589. See also 
LeJeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital, 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990), where, in an excellent opinion 
by Justice Calogero, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized a somewhat limited right for 
certain bystanders to recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress. The Louisiana 
Legislature subsequently codified the claim. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315.6 (2020). 
392. The problem is exacerbated at summary judgment when a judge treats the scope 
of liability as a legal decision when there are factual issues at stake. In that regard, the court, if 
it grants summary judgment, clearly usurps the power of the fact finder. 
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discussion with one another, rather than having only one person make 
that decision. In cases where the judge is the fact finder, I would urge 
her or him to be aware that the scope of responsibility or liability issue 
is not a legal decision per se. It calls more on the humanity of the 
decision maker than her or his legal training. 
I urge the courts to continue to avoid the magic words of 
proximate cause, including foreseeability, sole cause, superseding 
cause, etc. Instead, the court should ask the jury, when deciding scope 
of liability, whether the general type of injury that the plaintiff suffered 
was one of the harms risked when the defendant acted, and acted 
negligently. That is, "Jurors, do you associate the type of injury which 
plaintiff suffered with the risks defendant's conduct posed?" I would 
add, but not insist upon, "In so deciding you should rely upon your 
common sense, your experience, and your sense of fairness." I believe 
the word fairness, while not free of opacity, is much clearer to the 
ordinary person than foreseeability, direct, remote, intervening, 
superseding, etc. It is, in essence, a command to the fact finder to do 
the right thing in the case before the court-and only that case. 
So, recapping, who should decide what? 
The court should decide duty at a categorical level. That is, are 
there policy reasons to limit the general duty to exercise reasonable 
care? Here the court should consider the Green policies of tort law, any 
applicable Code articles or legislation, and jurisprudence. 
Next the jury3 93 should decide whether the defendant breached the 
appropriate standard of reasonable care. The jury should decide cause-
in-fact. Thereafter, it should decide scope of liability or protection. 
Finally, if it gets that far, the jury should determine damages. Charting 
this approach to negligence: 
Issue Decision Maker 
Duty Judge 
Breach Jury 
Cause-in-Fact Jury 
Scope of Liability/Risk Jury 
Damages Jury 
393. Assuming reasonable minds could not disagree. If no reasonable person could find 
that the defendant breached the standard of care, then the court should decide as a matter of 
law (summary judgment, directed verdict, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict), not 
because the issue is legal, but because no reasonable juror could find for the plaintiff. The same 
thing is true for all the issues entrusted to the jury. 
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The table looks remarkably like the table for the traditional elements of 
negligence,39 4 but it eschews the words proximate and legal cause in 
favor of scope of liability, which is what is really going on. I would 
have no objection if a court preferred to refer to it as scope of 
responsibility. 
In assuring that courts, when deciding duty at the categorical 
level, consider and articulate the policies on which they rely, the spirit 
of the Realists-Green and Malone-lives on. The law becomes even 
more transparent, and courts will both realize and manifest that, in 
deciding whether to make an exception to the general duty of care, they 
are making choices. And they should, as Green and Malone argued, 
articulate the reasons for those choices. 
Moreover, in expressly entrusting the scope of liability/risk issue 
to the fact finder, courts will make clear that scope of liability issues at 
the case-specific level are not legal questions; they are not based on 
policy, and they have no precedential value for the future. And in 
abandoning the language of proximate or legal cause, the courts will 
make the law simpler and will fulfill the legacies of Green and Malone: 
eliminate the mumbo jumbo; pull back the curtain; and sensibly 
allocate decision-making responsibility. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Law ought to be as simple as possible. It ought to make sense. It 
ought to be honest. Today, negligence law in Louisiana is not simple, 
the courts' approach to it does not always make clear sense, and the 
judicial approach to analyzing negligence is inconsistent. The proposal 
set forth herein will go a long way to improving things on all those 
fronts. 
394. See also Doucetv. Alleman, 2015-254, p. 3 (La. App. 3d Cir. 10/7/15); 175 So. 3d 
1107, 1109 (following essentially the traditional negligence scheme); Carpenter v. Foremost 
Signature Ins. Co., 47,008, p. 5 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2/29/12); 87 So. 3d 264, 268 (following 
essentially the traditional negligence scheme). 
